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Abstract
Algorithmic game theory studies computational and algorithmic
questions arising from the behavior of players in strategic situations.
The computational aspects of game theory became subject to closer
scrutiny in the last two decades. One reason for this is certainly the
advent of large scale communication networks – most prominently the
Internet. Modern technology allows to monitor, evaluate, and influ-
ence the behavior of interacting agents in large systems. One may
think of many (future) applications including distribution of goods
and services in auctions, allocation of resources, routing of data pack-
ages, or regulation of vehicle traffic. One of the main contributions of
game theory is the ability to predict how these games will be played.
The most commonly used solution concepts are equilibrium concepts
that describe which strategies will be adopted by players.
One of the central challenges in algorithmic game theory is to
characterize the computational complexity of such equilibria. Results
in this direction yield important indicators if game-theoretic solution
concepts are plausible outcomes of competitive environments in prac-
tice. Furthermore, computational complexity is of practical impor-
tance if one desires to predict or influence the outcome of a strategic
situation in a large-scale environment.
In this work, we answer fundamental complexity theoretic ques-
tions about several equilibrium concepts. We investigate the complex-
ity of problems regarding the existence, recognition, and computation
of Nash equilibria, strong equilibria, and sink equilibria. Probably the
most prominent solution concept in (non-cooperative) game theory is
the Nash equilibrium – a strategy profile, from which no player can
profitably unilaterally deviate. A refinement of Nash equilibria is
the concept of strong equilibrium – a strategy profile, from which no
coalition wants to jointly deviate. We also study the dynamics that
emerge when players iteratively play best responses. That is, in each
time step one of the players chooses his optimal strategy given that
strategies of the other players are fixed. We identify games in which
this process converges to an equilibrium and study the duration of
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this process. For games in which the best response dynamics does
not converge, the concept of sink equilibrium was proposed. Intu-
itively, a sink equilibrium is the set of strategy profiles on which the
aforementioned best response dynamics eventually ends up without
leaving this set again. A sink equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in
every finite game. We study the complexity of two basic questions
related to sink equilibria – whether a given strategy profile belongs
to a sink equilibrium and whether a game has a sink equilibrium that
consists of more than one strategy profile.
We study these equilibrium concepts in games that have a succinct
representation. Unlike games in normal form, in which the utilities or
payoffs for the players are given explicitly for every possible strategy
profile of the game, we consider games that have a certain underly-
ing combinatorial structure which allows for a compact description
of the game: That is, the description size of the game grows only
polynomial with natural parameters such as the number of players
or the number of strategies. A well studied class of succinct games
are congestion games. They are an elegant model to adress the ef-
fects of resource usage and congestion with strategic agents and have
been used frequently to model competitive network routing scenarios.
We also consider two generalizations of the class of congestion games,
namely weighted and player-specific congestion games, and a varia-
tion in form of bottleneck congestion games. In addition, we study the
class of anonymous games with a constant number of actions. Here,
a player’s payoff does not depend on the identities of others players,
which allows to represent the game in polynomial space.
Finally, we question the assumption of selfish players and consider
a scenario in which players are partly altruistic. We study the exis-
tence and the complexity of equilibria in congestion games with such
players. Some of our results can be extended to a class of general
potential games and social cost functions, and we study a number of
prominent examples. In addition to these results for uncoordinated
dynamics, we consider a scenario with a central altruistic institution
that can set incentives for the agents to adopt favorable behavior.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Game theory studies behavior of agents in strategic situations in which an agent’s
utility depends on the choices of other agents. To predict and describe the out-
come of a game, several solution concepts have been proposed. Chief among
them is certainly the concept of Nash equilibrium – named after John Forbes
Nash, Jr. who proposed this concept in his 28 pages dissertation [Nas50] on non-
cooperative games in 1950. A solution concept should rely only on some natural
reasonable assumptions and satisfy certain desirable properties. For example, for
the concept of Nash equilibrium – a strategy profile in which no single player
can improve by deviating to another strategy – we assume that agents have full
information and behave rationally to maximize their individual utility. Among
the desirable properties are universality – the solution concept should be able
to explain the outcome of every game – and uniqueness – it should predict ex-
actly one outcome for a given game. Nash equilibria are not unique, however,
Nash proved that his equilibrium exists in every game if one allows for mixed
strategies. That is, a player chooses a probability distribution over his set of
strategies – an assumption that we will question later. In recent years – although
the question was raised some 50 years ago [Rab57] – computational aspects of
equilibria received increasing attention and added another criterion. A series of
papers [DGP09,CD05,DP05,CDT09] revealed evidence that computing a Nash
equilibrium is computationally difficult. That is, computing a Nash equilibrium
– even in two player games – is hard for a complexity class PPAD [Pap94]. Such
intractability results cast doubt on the predictive power of an equilibrium con-
cept. Furthermore, the complexity of equilibria is of great practical importance.
Therefore, we seek to identify classes of games for which efficient algorithms exist.
Another drawback of the Nash equilibrium is that in general it exists only
in mixed strategies. If one restricts the allowed strategies to pure ones, i.e., ev-
ery player chooses exactly one strategy, existence of pure Nash equilibria are no
longer guaranteed in general. There are, however, practically important classes of
games that allow pure Nash equilibria, most prominently the class of congestion
games that was introduced by Rosenthal [Ros73]. In a congestion game, there
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is a set of resources, and the pure strategies of players are subsets of this set.
Each resource has a delay function depending on the load, i.e., the number of
players that select strategies containing the respective resource. Each player’s
cost is the sum of the delays of the resources in his chosen strategy. Conges-
tion games are an elegant model that is expressive enough to capture a large
number of applications – including traffic routing, resource allocation, and net-
work design. For these games the complexity of exact and approximate pure
Nash equilibria is well studied. A detailed characterization in terms of, e.g., the
structure of strategy spaces [FPT04,ARV08] or the delay functions [CS07,SV08]
has been derived. To overcome certain limitations of this model, several ex-
tensions and variations have been proposed. If we extend the model to allow
for player-specific delay functions [Mil96,Mil06,ARV08] or for players with dif-
ferent weights [FKS05, DS06, ARV09], existence of pure Nash equilibria is no
longer guaranteed. Only recently, a variation of congestion games that mod-
els applications like bandwidth allocation more realistically received increasing
attention [CDR06,MMST06,BO07,HKM09]. In this model of bottleneck conges-
tion games the individual cost of a player is the maximum (instead of sum) of
the delays in his strategy. A more general model that we consider are anonymous
game [Blo99,Blo00], in which the cost of a player does not depend on the identity
of the other players. More formally, in an anonymous games, the players have a
common set of strategies and each player’s individual payoff function maps from
his chosen strategy and the number of players that have chosen each strategy. A
notable case are games with a constant number of strategies, in which the exis-
tence of pure Nash equilibria can be decided efficiently [BFH09], and for mixed
Nash equilibria there exists a FPTAS [DP07,DP08]. We study the complexity of
deciding whether pure Nash equilibria exist in instances of these games and the
complexity of computing them to gain a complete picture of the complexity of
pure Nash equilibria.
To study the outcome of games that do not posses pure Nash equilibria,
Goemans, Mirrokni, and Vetta [GMV05] introduced the concept of sink equilibria.
A sink equilibrium is a set of strategy profiles to which the Nash dynamics of
a game will eventually converge. In Nash dynamics, agents repeatedly respond
to the current strategy profile of the game by playing a best-response strategy.
To be more precise, sink equilibria are strongly connected components of the
best response graph associated with the game with no outgoing edges. Studying
such dynamics is very important for understanding the behavior of a system
throughout time and the outcome of the game after repeated game play. Recently,
Fabrikant and Papadimitriou [FP08] initiated the study of the complexity of sink
equilibria by studying the problem of verifying if a strategy profile is in a sink
equilibrium. We systematically study this problem and the problem whether
there is a sink equilibrium that contains more than one strategy profile.
The concept of Nash equilibrium is only resilient against unilateral deviations.
It neglects the aspect of cooperation or coordination between agents. Obviously, in
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many scenarios agents have an incentive to cooperate, as cooperation often allows
to dramatically improve the situation of every participant. This shortcoming of
Nash equilibrium has been addressed by Aumann [Aum59] who introduced the
strong equilibrium – a strategy profile, from which no coalition of agents can
jointly deviate and thereby strictly improve all members of the coalition. We
initiate the systematic study of the complexity of strong equilibria. We settle
the complexity of deciding if a strong equilibrium exists, recognizing a strategy
profile as a strong equilibrium, and computing a profitable coalitional deviation
for several classes of games in which strong equilibria do not exist in general. For
bottleneck congestion games, Harks et al. [HKM09] recently established the finite
improvement property via a lexicographic potential function. Interestingly, they
were able to extend these conditions to hold even if coalitions of players are al-
lowed to change their strategy. This implies that bottleneck congestion games do
admit strong equilibria. We identify subclasses of bottleneck congestion games,
which allow for a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a strong equilibrium.
In addition, we study the complexity of computing a profitable coalitional devi-
ation and the dynamics of such sequences of improvement steps.
The assumption of selfishness in the preferences of agents is found in the
vast majority of present work. However, this assumption has been repeatedly
questioned by economists and psychologists. In experiments it has been ob-
served that participant behavior can be quite complex and contradictive to self-
ishness [Led97,Lev98]. We study the effects of introducing altruistic agents into
congestion games. Altruistic behavior is modeled by a linear trade-off between
selfish and social objectives. Our model can be embedded in the framework of
congestion games with player-specific latency functions. Stable states are the
pure Nash equilibria of these games, and we examine their existence and the
convergence of sequential best-response dynamics. We extend some results to a
class of general potential games and social cost functions, and we study a number
of prominent examples. In addition to our results for uncoordinated dynamics,
we consider a scenario with a central altruistic institution that can set incen-
tives for the agents. We provide constructive and hardness results for finding the
minimum number of altruists to stabilize an optimal congestion profile and more
general mechanisms to incentivize agents to adopt favorable behavior.
1.1 Non-cooperative Game Theory and Equilib-
rium Concepts
In this section we summarize the necessary game-theoretic knowledge and nota-
tion for the remainder of this thesis. We introduce the basic notion of strategic
games and the several solution concepts for non-cooperative games. These solu-
tion concepts are Nash equilibrium, strong equilibrium and sink equilibrium.
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Definition 1.1 (Strategic Game) A strategic game or a game in normal form
is a tuple
Γ = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N 〉
that consists of
• a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of players,
• a set Si of pure strategies for each player i ∈ N , and
• a utility function ui : ×i∈NSi → R for each player i ∈ N .
If every player i chooses exactly one strategy si from his set of strategies Si,
we call the vector S = (s1, . . . , sn) a pure strategy profile. The utility function
ui : ×i∈NSi → R maps pure strategy profiles to a utility value for player i. More
generally if every player chooses amixed strategy, that is a probability distribution
σi over his strategy space Si, we call Σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) a mixed strategy profile.
Hence, a player’s expected utility is∑
(s1,...,ss)∈(×i∈NSi)
∏
j∈N
σj(sj)ui(s1, . . . , sn).
For a strategy profile S, we denote by S−i the strategy profile without player
i. For a set of players C, we denote by S−C the strategy profile without these
players and by SC the strategy profile of only the players in C.
In a non-cooperative setting, we assume that each player seeks to maximize
his (expected) utility. In his seminal article, Nash [Nas50] proposed a solution
concept of non-cooperative equilibrium that later became known as Nash equi-
librium. A game is at Nash equilibrium if no agent can improve his utility by
unilaterally switching to an alternative strategy.
Definition 1.2 (Nash equilibrium) A mixed strategy profile Σ = (σ1, . . . , σn)
is a mixed Nash equilibrium if no player i ∈ N can benefit from unilaterally
deviating from his strategy to another strategy. That is, for all players i ∈ N and
for all mixed strategies σ′i the following holds:
ui(σ−i, σ′i) ≤ ui(σ).
Nash proves that for every game there exists a mixed strategy profile that is
a Nash equilibrium. This concept requires that agents use randomization. That
might not always be a realistic assumption or might not be wanted. A restriction
to pure strategy profiles is called a pure Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1.3 (Pure Nash equilibrium) A pure strategy profile S = (s1, . . . , sn)
is a pure Nash equilibrium if no player i ∈ N can benefit from unilaterally de-
viating from his strategy to another pure strategy. That is, for all players i ∈ N
and for all pure strategies s′i ∈ Si the following holds:
ui(S−i, s′i) ≤ ui(S).
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Heads Tails
Heads 1 / −1 −1 / 1
Tails −1 / 1 1 / −1
Figure 1.1: Payoffs for Matching Pennies
Pure Nash equilibria, however, are not guaranteed to exist. The simple example
of Matching Pennies demonstrates this.
Example 1.4 (Matching Pennies) In the Matching Pennies Game two people
simultaneously decide which side of a coin to show. One wins if they both show
the same side, the other wins if one shows heads and the other one shows tails.
The looser of the game has to pay off the winner. The game matrix is shown in
Figure 1.1. At the unique Nash equilibrium both people play both strategies with
probability 1
2
.
However, there are classes of games that guarantee the existence of pure Nash
equilibria. Most prominently the class of potential games [MS96] that coincides
with the class of congestion games [Ros73]. In this thesis we do not consider
solution concepts that require mixed strategies. In the following we use, e.g.,
strategy and equilibrium as shorthand for pure strategy and pure equilibrium,
respectively.
Definition 1.5 (Best Response) For a strategy profile S and a player i ∈ N ,
a strategy s is a best response if it is the best strategy given the strategy of the
other players are fixed. That is
ui(S−i, s) ≥ ui(S−i, s′) for all s′ ∈ Si.
When studying pure Nash equilibria, it is beneficial to consider the so-called
Nash dynamics. The Nash dynamics is a directed graph G = (V,E) that has the
set of strategy profiles as vertices. There is an edge from one profile to another
if the latter can be obtained by a best response of one player to the former.
Definition 1.6 (Nash Dynamics) The Nash dynamics is a directed graph G =
(V,E) with
• V = ×i∈NSi and
• (S, (S−i, s)) ∈ E if there is a player i ∈ N and s ∈ Si is a better response
for player i to profile S.
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Studying Nash dynamics is an important approach for analyzing the outcome of
games with repeated selfish behavior of self-interested agents. We say a game
converges to a Nash equilibrium if the Nash dynamics is a directed acyclic graph.
In other words, every sequence of best responses reaches a Nash equilibrium.
Sink equilibria have been introduced by Goemans, Mirrokni, and Vetta [GMV05]
for studying social cost on Nash dynamics over pure strategies in games. This is
of particular interest for games that do not possess pure Nash equilibria.
Definition 1.7 (Sink Equilibrium) A sink equilibrium is a subset T of strat-
egy profiles that form a strongly connected component of the Nash dynamics such
that there is no outgoing edge from states in T to any state outside T .
As a result, any pure Nash equilibrium of a game is a single-profile sink equilib-
rium, and a game may have several sink equilibria. The existence of at least one
sink equilibrium is guaranteed for every game.
As noted above, Nash equilibria are strategy profiles that are stable against de-
viations of a single player that improves his utility. Aumann [Aum59] introduced
the concept of strong equilibria that generalizes the concept of Nash equilbria
towards deviations of several players. A strong equilibrium is a strategy profile
that is resilient to deviations of coalitions of players in which every player of the
coalition improves his utility.
Definition 1.8 (Strong Equilibrium) A strategy profile S is a strong equilib-
rium if no subset of the players I ⊆ N can benefit from jointly deviating from
their strategies to other strategies, i.e.,
6 ∃S ′ 6= S and I ⊆ N : ∀i ∈ I : ui(S ′) > ui(S) and ∀i ∈ N \ I : si = s′i.
It turns out that many problems regarding equilibria are computationally
hard. An obvious approach is approximation. A natural and convincing notion
of approximation for equilibria (see, e.g., [ARV08,AAE+08,CS07,GLMT04,RT02,
SV08]) assumes that agents are ambivalent between strategies whose delays differ
by less than a factor of α, for some α > 1. Similarly, we consider the approximate
Nash dynamics that is restricted to moves that improve a player’s utility by a
factor of at least α.
Definition 1.9 (Approximation)
• An α-approximate equilibrium is a state of the game in which none of the
players can unilaterally improve his utility by at least a factor of α.
• An α-best response is a unilateral strategy change that improves the utility
of a player by a factor of at least α.
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• An α-approximate strong equilibrium is a state of the game in which no
coalition of players can deviate such that every player improves his utility
by a factor of at least α.
1.2 Succinct Games
When considering the complexity of games with a large number of players, we
have to discuss the issue of input size. If we represent the payoff functions of a
game with n players as n-dimensional matrices with an entry for every strategy
profile, the size of these matrices grows exponentially with n. Many games,
however, have an underlying structure that allows a succinct representation. In
this section, we introduce several of these models. These are congestion games
with its extensions of weighted and player-specific congestion games, bottleneck
congestion games, and anonymous games.
1.2.1 Congestion Games
Congestion games are a well-established approach to model scenarios in which
selfish agents individually seek to allocate resources as effectively as possible.
They have been introduced by Rosenthal [Ros73] in 1973.
Definition 1.10 (Congestion Game) A congestion game is defined by a tuple
Γ = 〈N,E, (Si)i∈N , (de)e∈E〉
where
• N is the set of players,
• E is a set of resources,
• Si ⊆ 2E is the strategy space of player i ∈ N , and
• de : N → Z is a delay function associated with resource e.
For a strategy profile S = (s1, . . . , sn), we define the congestion ne(S) on
resource e by ne(S) = |{i | e ∈ si}|, that is ne(S) is the number of players that
selected an strategy containing resource e in S. The cost (or delay) ci(S) of player
i in a strategy profile S is
ci(S) =
∑
e∈si
de(ne(S)).
In terms of strategic games as defined in Definition 1.1, a player’s utility is the
inverse of his cost. That is
ui(S) = −ci(S).
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s t
a
b
c
d
Figure 1.2: The Prisoners Dilemma as a network congestion game.
Rosenthal [Ros73] proved that congestion games always possess a pure Nash
equilibrium. He introduced the following potential function
Φ(S) =
∑
e∈E
ne(S)∑
i=1
de(i).
This potential function has the property that if player i changes his strategy
from s to s′ and decreases his cost by ∆, the value of the potential function also
decreases by ∆:
Φ(S−i, s)− Φ(S−i, s
′) =
∑
e∈E
ne(S−i,s)∑
i=1
de(i)−
∑
e∈E
ne(S−i,s
′)∑
i=1
de(i)
=
∑
e∈s
de(ne(S−i, s))−
∑
e∈s′
de(ne(S−i, s′))
= ci(S−i, s)− ci(S−i, s′)
Holzmann and Law-Yone [HLY97] studied strong equilibria in congestion
games. They proved that congestion games do not possess strong equilibria in
general.
Example 1.11 A classic example of a game without a strong equilibrium is the
Prisoners Dilemma. We describe it as a network congestion game with the di-
rected graph as depicted in Figure 1.2. The delay functions of the edges a and
c are da(x) = dc(x) = x and the delay functions of the edges b and d are
db(x) = dd(x) = 2.1.
We need show that none of the four strategy profiles is a strong equilibrium.
The profile ({a, c}, {a, c}) is a Nash equilibrium in which both players have costs
of 4. However, it is not a strong equilibrium, since there is a deviation of a
coalition consisting of both player to the profile ({a, d}, {b, c}) which results in
cost of 3.1 for each of them. However, ({a, d}, {b, c}) is not a strong equilibrium,
either. Each of the two players can unilaterally decrease his cost. Each player
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can deviate to strategy {a, c} and decrease his cost to 3. It is easy to see that the
remaining two strategy profiles are not strong equilibria, either.
Milchtaich [Mil96] introduced player-specific congestion games as a general-
ization of congestion games, in which each player has an individual delay function
for each resource.
Definition 1.12 (Player-Specific Congestion Games) A player-specific con-
gestion game is defined by a tuple
〈N,E, (Si)i∈N , (de,i)e∈E,i∈N〉
where
• N is the set of players,
• E is a set of resources,
• Si ⊆ 2
E is the strategy space of player i ∈ N , and
• de,i : N → Z is a delay function associated with resource e and player i.
The congestion ne(S) on resource e is defined the same way as in congestion
games. The cost ci(S) of player i in a strategy profile S is
ci(S) =
∑
e∈si
de,i(ne(S)).
Milchtaich shows [Mil96] that player specific congestion games possess Nash equi-
libria if the strategies are restricted to singleton sets. In the general case these
games do not possess pure Nash equilibria.
In weighted congestion games, each player i ∈ N has weighted demand wi.
The delay of a resource depends on the sum of the weights of the players that
use this resource.
Definition 1.13 (Weighted Congestion Games) A weighted congestion game
is defined by a tuple
Γ = 〈N, (wi)i∈N , E, (Si)i∈N , (de)e∈E〉
where
• N is the set of players,
• wi is the weight of player i ∈ N ,
• E is a set of resources,
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• Si ⊆ 2E is the strategy space of player i, and
• de : N → Z is a delay function associated with resource e.
In this game, the congestion (load) on resource e in a state S, denoted by the
sum of the weight of the players on that resource. That is, the load le(S) is given
by
le(S) =
∑
i∈N with e∈si
wi.
The cost or delay ci(s) of player i in a strategy profile s is
ci(s) =
∑
e∈si
de(le(s)).
All models of congestion games that we presented above have in common that
players’ cost are the sum of the delay of the chosen resources. This, however, is
not realistic for all applications. For example, in multi-hop network-routing the
overall throughput is determined by the edge with minimal bandwidth. Such a
scenario is captured by the model of bottleneck congestion games that is similar
to congestion games. The main difference is that here players seek to minimize
the delay of the resource with highest delay.
Definition 1.14 (Bottleneck Congestion Game) A bottleneck congestion game
is defined similar to regular congestion games by a tuple
Γ = 〈N,E, (Si)i∈N , (de)e∈E〉
where
• N is the set of players,
• E is a set of resources,
• Si ⊆ 2E is the strategy space of player i ∈ N , and
• de : N → Z is a delay function associated with resource e.
In contrast to regular congestion games, the cost of a player is not the sum but
the maximum of his chosen resources. That is, the cost ci(s) of player i in a
strategy profile s is
ci(s) = max
e∈si
de(ne(s)).
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1.2.2 Combinatorial Structure of Congestion Games
In the above definitions we did not restrict the strategy sets of the players. Typ-
ically, however, the strategy spaces have a combinatorial structure. For instance,
the sets of strategies can be sets of paths in a network or sets of trees in a graph.
Definition 1.15 We call a congestion game
• a singleton congestion game if all strategies are singleton sets. That is, for
each s ∈
⋃
i∈N Si : |s| = 1.
• symmetric if all players have the same set of strategies. That is Si = Sj for
all players i, j ∈ N .
• a matroid congestion game if for every player i ∈ N the player’s strategy
space Si is the set of bases of a matroid1.
• a network congestion game if the set of resources E is the set of edges in a
directed graph G = (V,E), and if for each player i ∈ N the set of strategies
Si is the set of paths from a particular source si ∈ V to a particular sink
ti ∈ V .
We also consider network congestion games with common delay functions,
i. e. , all players sharing an edge observe the same delay, however we assume that
each player is restricted to a certain subset of the edges. We call such a game
a restricted network congestion game. Such a game can easily be interpreted as
a player-specific game by defining player-specific delay functions in the following
way. If a player is allowed to use an edge, her delay functions equals the common
one, if a player is not allowed to use an edge, she observes delay ∞ for every
congestion on that edge.
1.2.3 Anonymous Games
Anonymous games [Blo99,Blo00] are strategic games in which the players’ utility
function do not depend on the identities of the other players. To be more precise
players choose from a common set of strategies and the utility of a player does
only depend on his chosen strategy and the number of players that chose each
strategy.
Definition 1.16 (Anonymous Games) An anonymous game is a tuple
Γ =< N,S, (ui)i∈N >
where
1Some basic matroid theory can be found in the Appendix.
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• N is the set of players,
• S is a set of strategies,
• and ui : S × |N ||S| → R is a utility function for player i ∈ N .
Given a strategy profile S = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ ×i∈NS and a strategy s ∈ S, we define
|s| as the number of players that chose s, i.e.,
|s| := |{i ∈ N | si = s}| .
The utility of a player i ∈ N in strategy profile S is ui(si, (|s|)s∈S).
An interesting subclass of these games is the class of anonymous games in
which the size of the strategy set of players is a fixed constant. These games can
be represented in polynomial space.
1.3 Complexity
We assume the reader is familiar with the standard complexity classes, i.e., NP,
coNP, PSPACE, etc. Some of the problems that we investigate are in fact local
search problems that do not fit into the framework of decision problems. It turns
out that some of these problems are hard for the complexity class PLS.
1.3.1 The Complexity Class PLS.
A local search problem Π is given by its set of instances IΠ. For every instance
I ∈ IΠ, we are given a finite set of feasible solutions F(I) ⊆ {0, 1}∗, an objective
function c : F(I)→ N, and for every feasible solution S ∈ F(I) a neighborhood
N (S, I) ⊆ F(I). Given an instance I of a local search problem, we seek for a
locally optimal solution S∗, i. e., a solution which does not have a strictly better
neighbor with respect to the objective function c.
A local search problem Π belongs to PLS if the following polynomial time
algorithms exist: an algorithm A which computes for every instance I of Π an
initial feasible solution S0 ∈ F(I), an algorithm B which computes for every
instance I of Π and every feasible solution S ∈ F(I) the objective value c(S),
and an algorithm C which determines for every instance I of Π and every feasible
solution S ∈ F(I) whether S is locally optimal or not, and finds a better solution
in the neighborhood of S in the latter case.
Johnson, Papadimitriou and Yannakakis [JPY88] introduce the notion of a
PLS-reduction. A problem Π1 in PLS is PLS-reducible to a problem Π2 in PLS
if there exist polynomial-time computable functions f and g such that f maps
instances I of Π1 to instances f(I) of Π2, g maps pairs (S2, I) where S2 denotes a
solution of f(I) to solutions S1 of I, and for all instances I of Π1, if S2 is a local
optimum of instance f(I), then g(S2, I) is a local optimum of I. A local search
problem Π in PLS is PLS-complete if every problem in PLS is PLS-reducible to Π.
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1.4 Outline and Bibliographical Notes
Due to the diversity of the models that we consider, we deliberately refrain from
giving a very broad description of related work at this point. We rather refer the
reader to the individual chapters that, therefore, can be read individually and in
arbitrary order.
In Chapter 2, we consider the complexity of pure Nash equilibria. We extend
a result of Fabrikant, Papadimitriou, and Talwar [FPT04] and show that it is
PLS-hard to compute a pure Nash equilibrium in congestion games even if the
number of players is constant. We complement this result by considering games
with a constant number of resources and provide a polynomial time algorithm for
computing a Nash equilibrium. For player-specific congestion games, that do not
possess pure Nash equilibria in general, we address the computational complex-
ity of the corresponding decision problem and prove that it is NP-complete to
decide whether a pure Nash equilibrium exists. This result also holds for games
with a constant number of players. Again, we can achieve a polynomial time
algorithm for games with a constant number of resources. Finally, we turn to
bottleneck congestion games and show that the positive results for matroid con-
gestion games of [ARV08] can be easily transferred to the corresponding class of
bottleneck congestion games. Unfortunately, we also observe that the hardness
proofs of [SV08] can directly be applied for bottleneck congestion games. These
results were in part presented at a conference and are therefore included in the
extended abstract at the corresponding conference proceedings:
• [AS07] On the Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria in Player-
Specific Network Congestion Games
Heiner Ackermann and Alexander Skopalik
In Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Internet and Network
Economics (WINE), 2007, pages 419–430.
The work on bottleneck congestion games is contained in the following, yet
unpublished, manuscript that has been submitted to a conference:
• [HHKS] Computing Pure Nash and Strong Equilibria in Bottle-
neck Congestion Games
Tobias Harks, Martin Hoefer, Max Klimm, and Alexander Skopalik
In Chapter 3, we study the complexity of sink equilibria [GMV05]. We con-
sider two problems: Is a given strategy profile in a sink equilibrium? Does a game
have a sink equilibrium that contains more that one strategy profile? We show
that both problems are PSPACE-hard for weighted congestion games, player-
specific congestion games, and anonymous games with a constant number of
strategies. This work is part of the following extended abstract:
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• [MS09] On the Complexity of Nash Dynamics and Sink Equilibria
Vahab Mirrokni and Alexander Skopalik
In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC),
2009, pages 1–10.
In Chapter 4 we consider the solution concept of strong equilibrium. We sys-
tematically study its complexity in various models. We consider the complexity
of the following problems: Existence: Does a given game have a strong equilib-
rium? Recognition: Is a given state of a game a strong equilibrium? Compu-
tation: If a game has a strong equilibrium, compute a strong equilibrium. We
show that for anonymous games the recognition problem can be solved in poly-
nomial time while deciding the existence is NP-hard. For player-specific singleton
congestion games we show that both problems can be solved in polynomial time.
For regular, i.e., non-singleton, congestion games, the existence problem is strong
co-NP-hard even for symmetric network games that simultaneously have the ma-
troid structure. For bottleneck games, for which the existence of strong equilibria
is guaranteed [HKM09], we prove that strong equilibria can be computed in poly-
nomial time in symmetric network and matroid games. The recognition problem,
however, is co-NP-hard even for these subclasses. For general games, we show
that the problem of computing a strong equilibrium is NP-hard. These results are
contained in the following two yet unpublished manuscripts that are submitted
to conferences:
• [HS] On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equi-
libria
Martin Hoefer and Alexander Skopalik
• [HHKS] Computing Pure Nash and Strong Equilibria in Bottle-
neck Congestion Games
Tobias Harks, Martin Hoefer, Max Klimm, and Alexander Skopalik
In Chapter 5 we question the assumption of selfish agents and consider a
model in which agents’ behavior is in part altruistic. We consider a model – mo-
tivated by Ledyard [Led97] – in which an agent’s utility is a linear combination of
his individual cost and the social cost. We show that in congestion games the ex-
istence of Nash equilibria is guaranteed only for matroid games with convex delay
functions and (general) games with linear delay functions. This result is based on
a more general condition, which is applicable to prove existence and convergence
in games with potential functions from different domains. In the case of weighted
congestion games on parallel links with linear delay functions we observe that even
a slight variation in the interplay of social cost and potential functions can lead
to instability and negative results. For the classes of congestion games for which
existence of equilibria is not guarantee, we consider the complexity of the prob-
lem to decide whether an equilibrium exists. Only for symmetric singleton games
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we are able to obtain a polynomial time algorithm. For asymmetric or general
symmetric games we show NP-hardness. Finally, from a different perspective, we
consider the question of how many altruists are necessary to guarantee that there
is a Nash equilibrium with certain, e.g., optimal, cost. We present polynomial
time algorithms for singleton games and complement them by NP-hardness proofs
for the slightly more general model of symmetric network congestion games.
Preliminary results have been presented at the following two conferences:
• [HS09a] Altruism in Congestion Games
Martin Hoefer and Alexander Skopalik
In Proceedings of the 17th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms
(ESA), 2009, pages 179–189
• [HS09b] Stability and Convergence in Selfish Scheduling with Al-
truistic Agents
Martin Hoefer and Alexander Skopalik
In Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
(WINE), 2009, pages 616–622
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Chapter 2
Pure Nash Equilibria
We now study the complexity of deciding the existence of pure Nash equilib-
ria and the complexity of computing an equilibrium. We start in Section 2.1
with an introduction and an overview over related literature, before we then, in
Section 2.3, study congestion games and extend known results to games with a
constant number of players or a constant number of resources. In Section 2.4 we
consider the complexity of player-specific congestion games. In Section 2.5 we
study bottleneck congestion games.
2.1 Introduction
Allocating a feasible and optimal subset of a given set of resources is a fundamen-
tal problem in many applications. For example, in networks users want to choose
paths, corresponding to subsets of the edges, along which they can stream data
as fast as possible. Many of these applications have in common that users are
driven by selfish, economic interests rather than by social ones. We are interested
in applications in which there is no central authority coordinating the assignment
of users to resources and we apply game theoretic tools in order to model the
users’ behavior. The seminal work of Rosenthal [Ros73] introduces congestion
games and proves the existence of pure Nash equilibria. Fabrikant, Papadim-
itriou, and Talwar [FPT04] show that computing a pure Nash equilibrium is a
PLS-complete problem. Their result even holds for symmetric games and asym-
metric network games. In the case of symmetric network congestion games they
provide a reduction to MinCostFlow that gives rise to a polynomial time al-
gorithm. If we restrict the strategy spaces further, one can obtain polynomial
time algorithms for singleton [IMN+05] and matroid congestion games [ARV08].
Skopalik and Vo¨cking [SV08] showed that the problem of computing an approx-
imate Nash equilibrium remains PLS-hard for asymmetric games. On the other
hand, Chien and Sinclair [CS07] showed that best response dynamics of symmet-
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ric games in which the delay functions are bounded1 converge in polynomial time
to an approximate pure Nash equilibrium.
For weighted congestion games, Fotakis, Kontogiannis, and Spirakis [FKS05]
show that even for symmetric games there are examples of weighted conges-
tion games that do not possess pure Nash equilibria. Dunkel and Schulz [DS06]
consider the computational complexity of deciding whether a weighted network
congestion game possesses a Nash equilibrium. They prove that deciding whether
an equilibrium exists, is NP-complete. Furthermore, they consider network con-
gestion games on parallel links with weighted players and player-specific delay
functions and prove that deciding whether such a game possesses a Nash equi-
librium is NP-complete, too. In the case of weighted matroid congestion games,
Ackermann, Ro¨glin, and Vo¨cking [ARV09] prove that pure Nash equilibria always
exist.
Milchtaich [Mil96] introduces player-specific network congestion games on par-
allel links. He shows that these games are not potential games, however, Nash
equilibria always exist and can be computed efficiently if the player-specific de-
lay functions are non-decreasing. In [Mil06] he presents some network topologies
such that every player-specific network congestion game on such a topology pos-
sesses an equilibrium without further assumption on the delay functions except
monotonicity. Ackermann, Ro¨glin, and Vo¨cking [ARV08] extend Milchtaich’s re-
sults [Mil96] towards player-specific matroid congestion games and show that the
matroid property is the maximal property on the strategy spaces guaranteeing
the existence of equilibria in player-specific congestion games. They also prove
that best response dynamics converge in polynomial time. Brandt, Fischer, and
Holzer [BFH07] studied the impact of various notions of symmetry and anonymity
on the complexity of pure Nash equilibria in strategic games.
However, regular congestion games have shortcomings, especially as models
for the prominent application of routing in computer networks. The delay of
a stream of packets is usually determined by the latency experienced due to
available bandwidth or capacity of links. Hence, the total delay of a player is
closely related to the performance of the most congested (bottleneck) link (see,
e.g., [Kes97,BO07,CDR06,QYZS06]). A model that captures this aspect more
realistically are bottleneck congestion games, in which the individual cost of a
player is the maximum (instead of sum) of the delays in his strategy. Despite
being a more realistic model for network routing, they do not receive similar
attention in the literature. For classes of non-atomic (with infinitesimal small
players) and atomic splittable games (finite number of players with arbitrarily
splittable demand) existence of pure Nash equilibria and bounds on the price of
anarchy are considered in [CDR06,MMST06]. For atomic games with unsplittable
demand pure Nash equilibria do always exist [BO07].
1Delay function de satisfies the β-bounded-jump condition if de(x + 1) ≤ β · de(x) for any
x ≥ 1.
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2.2 Our Results
We extend the results of Fabrikant, Papadimitriou, and Talwar [FPT04] and
show that it remains PLS-hard to compute a pure Nash equilibrium in restricted
network congestion games even with only three players. To complement this
results, we study congestion games in which the number of resources is constant.
Here, we are able to show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in
polynomial time.
For player-specific network games we settle the question of the complexity
of deciding whether a player-specific network congestion game possesses a Nash
equilibrium. We prove that this problem is NP-hard even for games with only
two players. Again, we consider games with a constant number of resources and
are able to obtain a polynomial time algorithm.
For bottleneck congestion games, we show that they can be transformed into
standard congestion games while preserving some useful properties. This allows
us to show polynomial time convergence of lazy best response dynamics in ma-
troid bottleneck congestion games. We also observe that the proofs of Skopalik
and Vo¨cking [SV08] also apply to bottleneck congestion games, which implies that
computing an approximate pure Nash equilibrium is PLS-hard and that approx-
imate best response does not converge to an approximate pure Nash equilibrium
in polynomial time. The latter even holds for games in which the delay functions
are bounded.
2.3 Congestion Games
We now consider restricted network congestion games with a constant number of
players or resources.
Theorem 2.1 Computing a Nash equilibrium of a restricted network congestion
game with k players is PLS-complete for any k ≥ 3.
Proof: We prove the theorem by a reduction from the local search prob-
lem positive not-all-equal 2-satisfiability PosNae2Sat which is known to be
PLS-complete [SY91]. Let x1, . . . , xn be boolean variables. An instance ϕ of
PosNae2Sat consists of a set of m weighted clauses Cj over the variables xi
which contain two positive literals each. We denote by wj the (non-negative in-
teger) weight of clause Cj. A clause is satisfied if and only if the two variables
it contains have different values. By X¯ = (X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ {0, 1}n we denote a
bit assignment to the variables x1, . . . , xn. The weight w(X¯) of a bit assign-
ment X¯ is defined as the sum of the weights of all satisfied clauses. We denote
the maximal weight by W =
∑m
j=1wj. With X¯Xi=b, we denote the bit vector
(X1, . . . , Xi−1, b, Xi+1, . . . , Xn). A local optimum of ϕ is a bit assignment X¯ whose
weight cannot be increased by flipping a single variable xi, i.e., w(X¯) ≥ w(X¯xi=b)
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for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and b ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore, the neighborhood of an assignment
is defined as the set of assignments with Hamming distance one.
Given an instance ϕ, we construct a restricted network congestion game Γϕ
such that one can easily construct a local optimum of ϕ given a Nash equilibrium
of Γϕ. Γϕ simulates two copies of ϕ, which we call ϕA and ϕB, in parallel.
Furthermore, the game consists of three players, a bit player and two clause
players.
Every path the bit player can choose determines assignments X¯A and X¯B for
ϕA and ϕB, respectively. The set of paths the bit player can choose from can be
divided into two disjoint sets P1 and P2. If she chooses a path from P1, X¯A is the
actual assignment for ϕ and X¯B is a (probably better) neighboring assignment.
For every path in P2 it is the other way round. The bit player switches between
paths in P1 and P2 as long as she can switch to a better neighboring assignment.
The paths of the clause players lead through 2m gadgets. For both copies of
ϕ there is one gadget for every clause. The two clause players simulate a clause
by choosing from four paths through the corresponding gadget. For each of the
two variables, there are two paths. There is one path for each bit assignment.
We ensure that they always have an incentive to correctly simulate the clauses
according to the assignments determined by the bit player. Through every gadget
they choose those two paths that correspond to this bit assignment.
To implement this we introduce four levels of delays: large, medium, small,
and tiny. If the bit player is on a path in P1 (P2) and the clause players do not
correctly simulate the clauses of ϕA (ϕB) according to the assignment X¯A (X¯B), at
least one of them has large delay. If the bit player is on a path in P1 (P2) and the
clause players simulate ϕA (ϕB) correctly, she observes medium delay proportional
to the weight of the unsatisfied clauses according to the actual assignment X¯A
(X¯B). Furthermore, she has additionally small delay that is proportional to the
weight of the unsatisfied clauses of the neighboring assignment X¯B (X¯A). If the
bit player is on a path in P1 (P2) and the clause players do not correctly simulate
ϕB (ϕA), they additionally have tiny delays. This ensures that the clause players
have an incentive to correctly simulate the clauses and that the bit player has an
incentive to choose the best neighboring assignment.
As long as there is a better neighboring assignment, the bit player can change
from a path from P1 (P2) to a path from P2 (P1) by adopting the neighboring
assignment as the actual assignment and by choosing a new neighboring assign-
ment.
We are now ready to describe our construction in detail. We present the
network of Γϕ as two subnetworks. One subnetwork contains the edges the bit
player is allowed to choose, the other subnetwork contains the edges the two clause
players are allowed to choose. The edges that are contained in both networks are
called connection edges. The connection edges are almost the only edges that
cause delay to the players. Almost all other edges have delay 0 regardless of the
number of players using it. To further simplify the presentation we merge path
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segments into sets of edges and use dashed edges to indicate these path segments
in Figure 2.1 and 2.2. The complete network can be constructed by concatenating
the edges from a set in arbitrary order while adding an edge that is not contained
in the other subnetwork between every pair of consecutive edges with constant
delay 0. Note, that the order of these edges along the paths is not important.
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Figure 2.1: The subnetwork of the bit player. The dashed edges correspond to
set of edges.
The subnetwork of the bit player is depicted in Figure 2.1. We now define the
corresponding sets of edges and the delays on the edges. Let M ≫ αW ≫ α ≫
βW ≫ β ≥ 4m.
• PAxi=b := {u
A
j,xi=b
, tBj,xi=b| for all clauses Cj with xi ∈ Cj}. Such a path seg-
ment corresponds to the fact that bit xi = b in the assignment X¯A. It also
corresponds to the fact that xi = b in the assignment X¯B, unless the bit
player chooses to flip this bit (see below). The u-edges have delay 0 for
one player and delay M for two or more players. They induce large delay
to clause players if they do not correctly simulate this bit assignment ϕA.
The t-edges have delay 0 for one player and delay 1 for two or more play-
ers. They induce tiny delay to the clause players if they do not correctly
simulate the bit assignment ϕB.
• WA := {wAj,0, w
A
j,1| for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m}. If the clause players correctly simu-
late ϕA, this path segment induces medium delay proportional to the weight
of the unsatisfied clauses of X¯A to the bit player. The edges w
A
j,0 and w
A
j,1
have delay 0 for one or two players and delay αwj for three players.
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• PAxi→b := {w
A
j,0,xi→b, w
A
j,1,xi→b| for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m with xi 6∈ Cj} ∪ {t
B
j,xi→b,
wAj,xi→b| for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m with xi ∈ Cj}. If the bit player chooses such a
path segment, then she determines the neighboring assignment X¯B to be
obtained from X¯A by flipping bit xi to b. If the clause players correctly
simulate ϕA, this path segment induces small delay proportional to the
weight of the unsatisfied clauses of that neighboring assignment. For each
1 ≤ j ≤ m with xi 6∈ Cj, the edges w
A
j,0,xi→b and w
A
j,1,xi→b have delay 0 for
at most two players and delay βwj for three. For each 1 ≤ j ≤ m with
xi ∈ Cj , the edge wAj,xi→b has delay 0 for one player and delay βwj for two
or more players. The t-edges have delay 0 for one player and delay 2 for
two or more players. They induce tiny delay to the clause players if they
do not simulate this bit flip in ϕB.
Additionally, there are sets PBxi=b, W
B, and PBxi→b which are defined in the
same manner.
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Figure 2.2: This figure shows an A-gadget and a B-gadget for a clause Cj =
{xa, xb}. There are four paths through each gadget. From top to bottom, we
denote the paths with xb = 0, xa = 0, xb = 1, and xa = 1. The subnetwork of
the two clause players is a concatenation of the A- and B-gadgets for all clauses.
The two clause players are symmetric in the sense that they play on the same
subnetwork and have the same source and target node. Their subnetwork is a
concatenation of m A-gadgets and m B-gadgets. Figure 2.2 depicts such a pair of
gadgets. Their source-sink paths lead through all 2m gadgets. The edges labeled
with mutex have delay 0 for one player and delay M2 for two or more players.
The dashed edges correspond to the following sets of connection edges:
• PACj ,xi=b := {u
A
j,xi=1−b, t
A
j,xi=1−b, t
A
j,xi→1−b}. A clause player using such a path
segment simulates the assignment of b to xi of X¯A in the clause Cj of ϕA. In
the following, we say she sets xi = b in this gadget. If this is not a correct
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simulation and the bit player is on a path from P1, then an u-edge induces
large delay. If this is not a correct simulation and the bit player is on a
path from P2, then a t-edge induces tiny delay.
• For each d ∈ {0, 1}, WAj,d := {w
A
j,d} ∪ {w
A
j,d,xi→b| for all b ∈ {0, 1} and 1 ≤
i ≤ n with xi 6∈ Cj}. If and only if both players use the same W
A
j,d path
segment they simulate an unsatisfying assignment for Cj. If, additionally,
the bit player chooses a path from P1, the edge wAj,d has medium delay
proportional to wj. Furthermore, one of the edges w
A
j,d,xi→b induces small
delay if xi is not in clause Cj. Note, that in the case that xi is in the clause
Cj there are extra edges in the gadget.
The sets PBCj ,xi=b and W
B
j,d are defined analogously.
We now prove that every Nash equilibrium of Γϕ corresponds to a locally
optimal assignment of ϕ. Consider a Nash equilibrium of Γϕ and assume that
the bit player chooses a path from the set P1. Let PAx1=X1 , . . . ,P
A
xn=Xn, W
A, and
PAxi∗→b be the path segments she chooses. Then the following properties hold.
Lemma 2.2
a) In every A-gadget for every clause Cj = {xa, xb} one clause player sets
xa = Xa and the other player sets xb = Xb.
b) In every B-gadget for every clause Cj = {xa, xb} with a, b 6= i∗ one clause
player sets xa = Xa and the other player sets xb = Xb.
c) In every B-gadget for every clause Cj = {xi∗ , xc} one clause player sets
xc = Xc and the other player sets xi∗ = b.
Proof: Observe that in any gadget for any clause Cj = {xa, xb} one of the
clause players chooses xa = 0 or xa = 1 whereas the other player chooses xb = 0
or xb = 1. Otherwise both have delay M
2 and, thus an incentive to change.
a) Consider the A-gadget of a clause Cj = {xa, xb}. Due to our assumptions,
all edges of the path segment PACj ,xa=Xa are not used by the bit player and
therefore have delay 0 for a single clause player, whereas the edge uAj,xa=Xa
that is contained in the path segment PACj ,xa=(1−Xa) is used by the bit player
and therefore causes delay M to a clause player. The same is true for the
path segments PACj ,xb=Xb and P
A
Cj ,xb=(1−Xb), respectively. The delay of all
other edges in the gadget sums up to less than M . Thus, in every Nash
equilibrium, one of the clause players chooses xa = Xa and the other player
chooses xb = Xb.
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b) In the B-gadgets all wB-edges and all edges in the WB-sets are not used
by the bit player and therefore have delay 0. Consider the B-gadget for a
clause Cj = {xa, xb} with a, b 6= i∗. All edges of the path segment PBCj ,xa=Xa
are not used by the bit player and therefore have delay 0 for a single clause
player, whereas the edge tBj,xa=Xa that is contained in the path segment
PBCj ,xa=(1−Xa) is used by the bit player and therefore has delay 1 for a clause
player. The same is true for the path segments PBCj ,xb=Xb and P
B
Cj ,xb=(1−Xb),
respectively.
c) Let Cj = {xi∗ , xc} be a clause that contains xi∗ . In the B-gadgets of clause
Cj, one clause player sets xc = Xc which has delay 0. The other clause
player sets xi∗ = b which has delay of at most 1. The path xi∗ = 1− b has
delay of at least 2 due to the edge tBj,xi→b which is currently used by the bit
player.
2
Note that an equivalent version of Lemma 2.2 holds for Nash equilibria in which
the bit player chooses a path from the set P2. The following observation follows
directly from Lemma 2.2.
Observation 2.3 In every Nash equilibrium the path segment WA has delay
α(W − w(X¯)) for the bit player. Furthermore, the delay on the path segment
PAxi∗→b equals β(W − w(X¯xi∗=b)) plus an additive term of at most 2m for the bit
player.
Lemma 2.4 Every Nash equilibrium of Γϕ corresponds to a local optimum of ϕ.
Proof: For the purpose of contradiction, consider a Nash equilibrium that
does not correspond to a local optimum of ϕ. Let PAx1=X1, . . . ,P
A
xn=Xn , W
A, and
PAxi∗→b be the path segments used by the bit player. By Observation 2.3, we
can conclude that X¯Xi∗=b is the best neighboring assignment; otherwise the path
segment PAxi∗→b has more delay then another path segment P
A
xi∗∗→b∗∗ for the bit
player. We show that this implies that the bit player can improve her delay
by choosing another path. The delays of all edges in the set WA sum up to
α(W − w(X¯)). Thus, the bit player has at least this amount of delay.
Now, observe that each path segment PBxi=X1 with i 6= i
∗ has delay 0 for the bit
player since the clause players correctly simulate ϕB with the assignment X¯Xi∗=b.
The path segment PBxi∗=b has delay of at most m. The delays of all edges in the
set WB sum up to α(W − w(X¯xi∗=b)). The delay of any path P
B
xi′→b′ is at most
βW + 2m. Note that βW + 3m < α. Thus, the bit player could decrease her
delay by changing to such a path. This is a contradiction to the assumption that
this is a Nash equilibrium. 2
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We conclude that every Nash equilibrium of Gϕ corresponds to a locally op-
timal assignment of ϕ. Obviously, the construction of Gϕ and the mapping of an
equilibrium to a assignment of ϕ can be done in polynomial time. 2
It is an interesting open problem whether computing Nash equilibria for re-
stricted network congestion games with two players remains PLS-complete. More-
over, it is an challenging open problem to prove any results in standard congestion
games with a constant number of players.
We now turn our attention to games with a constant number of resources.
Theorem 2.5 One can compute a Nash equilibrium of a restricted network con-
gestion game Γ with a constant number of resources in polynomial time.
Proof: Rosenthal’s potential function φ(S) =
∑
e∈E
∑ne(S)
i=0 de(i) already es-
tablishes a pseudopolynomial time upper bound on the convergence time of better
response dynamics in congestion games [Ros73]. In the case of a better response
dynamics, players iteratively deviate to better strategies. Now, observe that in
games with c19stant number m of resources, there are at most nm different con-
gestion vectors c¯ = (ne1 , . . . , nem). Thus, every state has one out of n
m possible
potential values, and therefore the better responses dynamics terminates after at
most nm steps. 2
Note that the previous proof applies to every congestion game with constant
number of resources. It is an open problem whether the problem is fixed parameter
tractable or not.
2.4 Player-Specific Congestion Games
In this section, we consider the complexity of deciding whether a general player-
specific network congestion game possesses a Nash equilibrium. We prove that
this problem is NP-complete even in the case of two players. present a reduction
from the Directed-Edge-Disjoint Path problem.
Finally, we consider games with networks of constant size and present a poly-
nomial time algorithm deciding whether a Nash equilibrium exists.
Theorem 2.6 It is NP-complete to decide whether a player-specific network con-
gestion game with two players possesses a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Obviously, the decision problem belongs to NP as one can decide in
polynomial time whether a state S of a player-specific network congestion game
with two players is a Nash equilibrium. In order to prove that the problem is
complete, we present a polynomial time reduction from the Directed-Edge-
Disjoint Path problem with two disjoint source-sink pairs. An instance of this
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problem consists of a directed graph G = (V,E) and two disjoint node pairs
(s1, t1) and (s2, t2). Given such an instance, we like to decide whether there exist
pairwise edge-disjoint paths between the two node pairs. This problem is known
to be NP-complete [FHW80].
ek ek,0
ek,1
ek,2
ek,3
ek,4
ek,5
ek,6
v vu u
⇒
Figure 2.3: The gadget Gek by which an edge ek is replaced.
Given an instance (G, (s1, t1), (s2, t2)) of theDirected-Edge-Disjoint Path
problem with two source-sink pairs we construct a player-specific network conges-
tion game Γ with two players as follows. We substitute every edge ek ∈ E by the
gadget Gek presented in Figure 2.3 in order to obtain the network GΓ = (VΓ, EΓ)
on which the game is played. Player i ∈ {1, 2} wants to allocate a path between
the nodes si and ti in GΓ. Observe that this construction ensures a one-to-one
corresponds between the paths in G and in GΓ in the natural way if we ignore
the precise subpaths through every gadget. LetM be a sufficiently large number.
Then, the player-specific delay functions of the edges ek,0, . . . ek,6 are defined as
presented in Figure 2.4. Observe that every gadget Gek implements a subgame
that is played by the players if both want to allocate a path connecting u and
v. If only one player wants to allocate such a path, then it allocates a player-
specific shortest path from u to v. If we choose M sufficiently large such that
the first player never allocates one of the edges ek,2 and ek,3, and such that the
second player never allocates one of the edges ek,5 or ek,6, then the delays of
these shortest paths are 3 and 5. Suppose now, that the two players play such a
subgame. In this case, it is not difficult to verify that the subgame possesses no
Nash equilibrium.
ek,0 ek,1 ek,2 ek,3 ek,4 ek,5 ek,6
congestion 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
player 1 0 M 1 1 M M M M 1 20 1 1 5 5
player 2 0 M 1 20 1 1 5 5 5 5 M M M M
Table 2.1: The player-specific delay functions of the edges ek,0, . . . , ek,6.
Suppose now, that we are given two node-disjoint paths P1 and P2 in G
connecting s1 and t1, and s2 and t2. We map these paths to paths in GΓ in the
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natural way, and choose player-specific shortest paths through every gadget. Let
n(Pi) be the number of edges on the path Pi. Thus, player 1 has delay 3 · n(P1),
and player 2 has delay 5 · n(P2). If one of the players had an incentive to change
her strategy, then she will only choose a path in which she shares no gadget with
the other player, as otherwise her delay would increase to at leastM . This is true
as in this case the players would share at least one edge ek,0. This also implies
that the delay of the other player does not increase due to the strategy change
of the first player. Observe that this holds for any further best response. Thus,
the players converge to an equilibrium after O(n) best responses as the delay of
a player decreases by at least the cost of the shortest path through a gadget.
Suppose now, that we are given a Nash equilibrium of Γ. In this case the play-
ers do not share a gadget as otherwise the state is no Nash equilibrium. Thus,
we can easily construct edge-disjoint paths in G connecting (s1, t1) and (s2, t2). 2
Now, we consider networks with a constant number of edges.
Theorem 2.7 One can decide in polynomial time whether a player-specific net-
work congestion game Γ with a constant number of edges possesses a Nash equi-
librium.
Proof: The algorithm we present generalizes a technique introduced by
Chakrabarty et al. [CMN05] in order to compute a social optimal state of a player-
specific network congestion game with a constant number of parallel links. Let
P = {P1, . . . Pl} be the set of paths in the network. Note that l ≤ 2m is constant.
Given a state S of Γ we denote by c¯(S) the congestion vector (c1(S), . . . , cl(S))
where ci(S) equals the number of players choosing path Pi in S. Observe that
there are at most nl ≤ n2
m
such vectors. In the following, we describe how to
decide whether there exists an equilibrium S of Γ such that c¯(S) equals a given
congestion vector c¯ = (c1, . . . , cl).
Given a congestion vector c¯ = (c1, . . . , cl) we construct a directed graph Gc¯ =
({s, t} ∪ N ∪ P, E(c¯)) with edge capacities as follows. For every player i ∈ N
there is a vertex ui which is connected to the vertex s. The capacity of such an
edge equals 1. For every path Pj ∈ P there is a vertex vj which is connected to
the vertex t. The capacity of such an edge equals cj . Furthermore, a vertex ui is
connected to a vertex vj if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. Player i does not want to change her strategy if she would play strategy Pj.
2. The congestion on the edges is determined by the vector c¯.
Now, we like to decide whether there exists a s-t-flow of capacity n. Observe
that such a flow exists if and only if cj units of flow can flow from cj different
player-vertices ui to path-vertices vj. Thus, if such a flow exists, and if we assign
a player to that path to which the unit of flow originating in its vertex flows,
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we obtain a Nash equilibrium, since the construction ensures that the player is
satisfied.
Finally, since there are polynomial many different vectors c¯, and since the
construction and analysis of Gc¯ can be done in polynomial time, we obtain a
polynomial time algorithm. 2
The running time of the algorithm is O(poly(2m) · poly(n2
m
)). An interesting
open problem is to prove that the problem is fixed parameter tractable, that is,
to develop algorithms with running time O(poly(2m) · poly(n)).
2.5 Bottleneck Congestion Games
We first observe that bottleneck congestion games can be transformed into regular
congestion games while preserving useful properties regarding the convergence to
pure Nash equilibria. This allows to show fast convergence to pure Nash equilibria
in matroid bottleneck games. We then show that hardness results for regular
congestion games in Skopalik and Vo¨cking [SV08] immediately imply identical
results for bottleneck congestion games.
The following lemma establishes a connection between bottleneck and regu-
lar congestion games. For a bottleneck congestion game Γ we denote by Γsum
the regular congestion game with the same set of players N , the same set of
resources E, and same sets of strategies (Si)i∈N as Γ except that we choose
d′e(S) = m
de(·), e ∈ E with m = |E|.
Lemma 2.8 Every pure Nash equilibrium for Γsum is a pure Nash equilibrium
for Γ.
Proof: Suppose s is a pure Nash equilibrium for Γsum but not for Γ. Thus,
there is player i ∈ N and strategy s′i ∈ Si with maxe∈si de(ne(S)) > maxe∈s′i de(ne(s
′
i, s−i)).
We define d¯ := maxe∈s′i de(ne(s
′
i, s−i)). This implies maxe∈si de(ne(s)) ≥ d¯ + 1.
We obtain a contradiction by observing∑
e∈si
d′e(ne(s)) ≥ max
e∈si
d′r(ne(s)) ≥ m
d¯+1 > (m− 1)md¯ ≥
∑
e∈s′i
d′e(ne(s
′
i, s−i)) .
2
We analyze the lazy best response dynamics considered for regular matroid
congestion games presented in [ARV08] and combine their analysis with Lemma 2.8.
This allows to establish the following result.
Theorem 2.9 Let Γ be a matroid bottleneck congestion game. Then the lazy best
response dynamics converges to a pure Nash equilibrium in at most n2 ·m ·rk(M)
steps.
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Proof: We consider the lazy best response dynamics in the corresponding
game Γsum. In addition, we suppose that a player accepts a deviation only if his
bottleneck value is strictly reduced. It follows that the duration is still bounded
from above by n2 ·m · rk(M) best responses as shown in [ARV08]. 2
The main result of [SV08] shows that computing an approximate pure Nash
equilibrium is PLS-hard. The proof is a reduction from CircuitFlip. We can
regard the resulting congestion game as a bottleneck congestion game. It is
straightforward to adjust all arguments in the proof of [SV08] to remain valid for
bottleneck congestion games. A standard transformation [FPT04] immediately
yields the same result even for symmetric games.
Corollary 2.10 Finding an α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium in a symmet-
ric bottleneck congestion game with positive and increasing delay functions is
PLS-complete, for every polynomial-time computable α > 1.
A second result in [SV08] reveals that sequences of α-improving moves do not
reach an α-approximate Nash equilibrium quickly – even if all delay functions
satisfy the β-bounded-jump condition with a constant β. For the reader’s conve-
nience, we included their proof in the Appendix of this thesis. Again, the proof
remains valid if one regards the game as an asymmetric bottleneck congestion
game. This yields the following corollary.
Corollary 2.11 For every α > 2, there is a β > 1 such that, for every n ∈ N,
there is a bottleneck congestion game G(n) and a state S with the following prop-
erties. The description length of G(n) is polynomial in n. The length of every
sequence of α-improving moves leading from S to an α-approximate equilibrium
is exponential in n. All delay functions of G(n) satisfy the β-bounded-jump con-
dition.
Using the same trick as before to convert an asymmetric game in a symmetric
one yields a similar result for symmetric games. However, we must sacrifice the
β-bounded-jump condition of the delay functions, for every β polynomial in n.
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Chapter 3
Sink Equilibria
We study the complexity of two decision problems related to sink equilibria. That
is (i) to decide whether a given game has a sink equilibrium that is not a pure
Nash equilibrium, and (ii) to decide if a given a strategy profile is part of a sink
equilibrium. After an introduction (Section 3.1) and a summary of our results
(Section 3.2), we study weighted congestion games in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4,
we show that theses results can be extended to player-specific congestion games.
In Section 3.5, we answer the above questions for anonymous games.
3.1 Introduction
A standard approach in studying the outcome of a system involving self-interested
behavior of agents is to investigate the Nash dynamics of the corresponding
games. In Nash dynamics, agents repeatedly respond to the current state of
the game by playing a best-response strategy. Studying such dynamics is very
important for understanding the behavior of a system throughout time, and the
outcome of the game after repeated game play. Similar to the recent efforts in
studying the complexity of game theoretic concepts such as mixed Nash equi-
libria [DGP06, CD06], and pure Nash equilibria [FPT04, SV08], studying the
complexity of Nash dynamics can help us better understand the outcome of a
game.
In an attempt to study such dynamics for pure strategies, Goemans, Mirrokni,
and Vetta [GMV05] introduced the concept of sink equilibria in games: sink equi-
libria are strongly connected components of a strategy profile graph associated
with the game with no outgoing edges. Equivalently, sink equilibria characterize
all states for which the probability of reaching that state after a sufficiently large
random best-response sequence is nonzero. Also any random best-response se-
quence will converge to a sink equilibrium with probability one. Moreover, sink
equilibria generalize pure Nash equilibria in that a pure Nash equilibrium is a
single-state sink equilibrium of the game.
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Goemans et al. [GMV05] studied sink equilibria for their social cost in two
classes of games. However, they did not consider the complexity of sink equilibria
or Nash dynamics in those games. Recently, Fabrikant and Papadimitriou [FP08]
initiated the study of the complexity of sink equilibria by studying the problem
of verifying if a state is in a sink equilibrium for two classes of games. Extending
on these ideas, we formalize several questions related to Nash dynamics of vari-
ous games and completely study the complexity of the Nash dynamics and sink
equilibria in these games.
Sink equilibria characterize all strategy profiles in the game with a non-zero
probability of reaching them after a long enough best-response walk. Therefore,
given a strategy profile, in order to verify if there is a non-zero probability of
reaching this state after a sufficiently long random best-response walk we need
to verify if this state is in a sink equilibrium or not. This problem has been
considered by Fabrikant and Papadimitriou [FP08] for two classes of games, and
is as follows: In a Sink. Given an instance of a game and a strategy profile in
this game, can we verify if this strategy profile belongs to any sink equilibria?
For a given state in a game, an interesting problem is to estimate the prob-
ability of reaching this state after a long random best-response walk. Note that
a hardness result for in a sink implies that for a given state, even approximat-
ing this probability is a computationally hard problem (since distinguishing the
probability of zero and nonzero is hard). Fabrikant and Papadimitriou showed
that in a sink is PSPACE-hard for graphical games and a BGP next-hop routing
game [FP08].
Given an instance of a game, it is very helpful to know if the random re-
peated self-interested actions of the agents in the game can cycle forever or such
dynamics will converge to a pure Nash equilibrium with probability one. This
problem is related to characterizing the structure of sink equilibria in a game,
and in particular the existence of non-singleton sink equilibria. Having such a
sink equilibrium indicates that even random Nash dynamics may also converge
to an everlasting cycle. As a result, we formalize the following problem in games:
Has a Non-singleton Sink. Given an instance of a game, can we verify if
this game possesses a non-singleton sink equilibrium, i.e., a sink equilibrium other
than a pure Nash equilibrium.
Answering all the above questions for a game gives a thorough understanding
of the complexity of Nash dynamics and the complexity of characterizing sink
equilibria in that game. Prior to this work, the Has a non-singleton sink
problem has not been studied for any of the above games. The In a sink problem
has been studied only for graphical games [FP08].
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3.2 Our Results
We study the above problems in a variety of games with succinct representation
including player-specific and weighted congestion games, and anonymous games.
All of these games are well-studied for their existence of pure Nash equilibria,
complexity of mixed and pure Nash equilibria, or/and their price of anarchy for
different social functions [Ros73,Mil96,DP07]. To solve these problems, we illus-
trate general techniques that could be used as tools to answer similar questions
for other classes of games.
Fabrikant and Papadimitriou showed that the in a sink problem is PSPACE-
hard for graphical games and a BGP next-hop routing game [FP08]. They posed
this problem as an open question for weighted congestion games. We show that
this problem is PSPACE-complete for weighted/player-specific congestion games,
and anonymous games. The proofs for both variants of congestion games are
similar and based on a reduction from the halting problem of a space bounded
Turing machine. The proof for anonymous games has unique features and is
different from those. The hardness of the in a sink problem in anonymous
games is despite the fact that approximate pure Nash equilibria can be computed
in these games in polynomial time [DP07].
For the Has a non-singleton sink problem, we prove that it is PSPACE-
complete for weighted/player-specific congestion games, and anonymous games.
The reductions for the Has a non-singleton sink problem extend the proofs
for the in a sink problem.
3.3 Weighted Congestion Games
In this section, we study the complexity of the In a Sink and Has a Sink
problem for weighted congestion games.
Theorem 3.1 In a Sink is PSPACE-hard for weighted congestion games.
Proof: We give a reduction from the space-bounded halting problem for Tur-
ing machines. First, we reduce an instance of this problem (a TM M , an input x
and a tape bound t) to the halting problem for a TM M ′ = (Q,Σ, b,Γ, δ, q0, {qh})
which simulates M on x without its own input. Let Σ = {0, 1} and Γ = {0, 1, b}.
Starting from an empty tape, M ′ halts if and only if M rejects x . Furthermore,
M ′ uses additional tape cells and states for a counter that counts up to the total
number of configurations of M . When M accepts, the counter overflows, or M
exceeds the tape bound t,M ′ erases the whole tape, moves the head to the initial
position and returns to state q0. M
′ uses tape cells only right of its initial position
and at most t′ tape cells. Note that starting from every total configuration M ′
never stops only if M rejects x.
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To complete the proof, we construct a congestion game GM ′ that simulates
Turing machineM ′. A strategy profile s which we define later is in a non-singleton
sink equilibrium if and only if M ′ runs forever. The game consists of three types
of configuration players, a transition player, a set of control players, and a clock
player. The first type of configuration players is a state player with |Q| strategies.
The second type of configuration players is a position player for the position of
the head with t′ strategies. The third type of configuration players is a set of cell
players celli for each tape cell 0 ≤ i ≤ t′ with the |Γ| strategies for the content of
the tape cell i. There is a simple bijective mapping between the strategy profiles
of the configuration players and the configurations of M ′.
The game is constructed in such a way that every sequence of improvement
moves can be divided in rounds. At the end of a round i, let ci denote the
configuration obtained from the strategy profile of the configuration players. For
every sequence of rounds, c1, c2, c3, . . . corresponds to the run ofM
′ starting from
c1.
We now describe our construction in more details. The strategies of the
configuration players are described in Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. Every strategy of
a configuration player has two unique resources, an α resource and a β resource.
The α resources have delay 0 if allocated by one player and delay 1 otherwise.
The β resources have delay 0 if allocated by one player and delay M otherwise,
where M is a large integer.
strategies resources delays
q ∈ Q αq 0/1
βq 0/M
Figure 3.1: Definition of strategies of the state player. The delays are depicted
for one and more players, respectively.
strategies resources delays
0 ≤ i ≤ t′ αi 0/1
βi 0/M
Figure 3.2: Definition of strategies of the position player.
Each control player has two strategies, Zero and One, which are constructed
in the same manner like strategies of configuration players (see Figures 3.4, 3.5,
and 3.6). The transition player has the following strategies Wait, Done, Halt,
and several strategies Readq,i,σ, Writeq′,i′,i,σ′ , and Verifyq′,i′,i,σ′ (for each i, i
′ ∈
{1, . . . , t′}, q, q′ ∈ Q, and σ, σ′ ∈ Σ). The details of these strategies and the
resources they contain are listed in Figure 3.7. The clock player has two strate-
gies, Trigger and Wait. Trigger contains the two resources, TriggerMain and
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strategies resources delays
σ ∈ Γ ασi 0/1
βσi 0/M
Figure 3.3: Definition of strategies of the player celli with 0 ≤ i ≤ t′.
Strategy Resources Delays
Zero β0W,q,i,i′,σ 0/M
α0W,q,i,i′,σ 0/1
One β1W,q,i,i′,σ 0/M
α1W,q,i,i′,σ 0/1
Figure 3.4: Definition of strategies of the player ControlW,q,i,i′,σ for each q ∈ Q,
0 ≤ i ≤ n, i′ ∈ {i− 1, 1, i+ 1}, and σ ∈ Γ .
TriggerClock. The strategy Wait contains one resource with constant delay of
110.
Let us remark that each α- or β-resource is allocated by at most two players;
the transition player and one of the configuration or control players. The general
idea is that the improvement moves for the transition player are determined
by the strategy profiles of the configuration and control players. That is, the
transition player never deviates to a strategy that contains a β-resource which is
allocated by another player. On the other hand, the transition player determines
the improvement moves for configuration and control players if he allocates α-
resources. Note that each α-resource is associated with exactly one strategy of
exactly one configuration or control player.
Now, we are ready to describe the aforementioned sequence of improvement
moves that corresponds to one round in more details. Consider any strategy
profile in which the clock player is on Trigger, the transition player is on Wait and
all control players except controlD are on One. Let q be the strategy of the state
player, i the strategy of the position player and σ0, . . . , σt′ the strategies played
by the players cell0, . . . , cellt′ . We now describe the sequence of improvement
moves emerging from this strategy profile.
1. The transition player deviates from Wait to Readq,i,σi.
2. Player controlW,q′,i′,i,σ′ deviates to Zero.
3. The transition player deviates to Writeq′,i′,i,σ′ .
4. The configuration players deviate to the new configuration and the player
controlV,q′,i′,i,σ′ deviates to Zero.
36 CHAPTER 3. SINK EQUILIBRIA
Strategy Resources Delays
Zero β0V,q,i,i′,σ 0/M
α0V,q,i,i′,σ 0/1
One β1V,q,i,i′,σ 0/M
α1V,q,i,i′,σ 0/1
Figure 3.5: Definition of strategies of the player ControlV,q,i,i′,σ for each q ∈ Q,
0 ≤ i ≤ n, i′ ∈ {i− 1, 1, i+ 1}, and σ ∈ Γ .
Strategy Resources Delays
Zero β0D 0/M
α0D 0/1
One β1D 0/M
α1D 0/1
Figure 3.6: Definition of strategies of the player ControlD.
5. The transition player deviates to Verifyq′,i′,i,σ′.
6. The player controlD deviates to One.
7. The transition player deviates to Done.
8. The clock player deviates to Wait and the controll players except controlD
deviate to Zero
9. The transition player deviates to Wait.
10. The clock player deviates to Trigger and the player controlD deviates to
Zero.
In the strategy profile at the end of the round the strategy profile of the
configuration players corresponds to the configuration of the Turing machine M ′
after one step. Note that this sequence is essentially unique as there are no other
improvement moves. If and only if the state player is on qh, the transition player
may move to the strategy Halt. This is a pure Nash equilibrium of GM ′. Now
let s be a strategy profile in which the clock players is on Trigger, the transition
player on Wait, and all control players except controlD on One. Let the configu-
ration players’ choice in s correspond to the initial configuration of M ′. Then, s
is in a non-singleton sink equilibrium if and only if M ′ does not halt. 2
We now consider the problem Has a non-singleton Sink for weighted
congestion games.
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Strategy Resources Delays
Wait β1W,q′,i′,i,σ′ , β
1
V q
′, i′, i, σ′ for all q′, i′, i, σ′ 0/M
α1D 0/1
TriggerMain 0/100/100
Readq,i,σ β
p for all p ∈ Q \ q 0/M
for each q ∈ Q, βj for all j 6= i 0/M
0 ≤ i ≤ t′ and σ ∈ Γ βσ
′
i for all σ
′ ∈ Γ \ σ 0/M
β1D 0/M
α0W,q′,i′,i,σ′
with δ(q, σ) = (q′, σ′, d) and i′ = i+ d 0/1
N.N. 80
Writeq′,i′,i,σ′ α
p for all p ∈ Q′ \ q′ 0/1
for each q′ ∈ Q, 0 ≤ i ≤ t′, αj for all j 6= i′ 0/1
i′ ∈ {i− 1, i, i+ 1}, ασi for all σ ∈ Γ \ σ
′ 0/1
and σ′ ∈ Γ α0V,q′,i′,i,σ′ 0/1
β0W,q′,i′,i,σ′ 0/M
N.N. 60
V erifyq′,i′,i,σ′ β
p for all p ∈ Q \ q′ 0/M
for each q′ ∈ Q, 0 ≤ i ≤ t′, βj for all j 6= i′ 0/M
i′ ∈ {i− 1, i, i+ 1}, βσi for all σ ∈ Γ \ σ
′ 0/M
and σ′ ∈ Γ β0V,q′,i′,i,σ′ 0/M
α0D 0/1
N.N. 40
Done triggerClock 0/0/20
β0D 0/M
α1W,q′,i′,i,σ′ , α
1
V,q′,i′,i,σ′ for all q
′, i′, i, σ′ 0/1
N.N. 20
Halt βq for all q ∈ Q \ qh 0/M
Figure 3.7: Definition of strategies of the transition player. Resources that are
denoted by N.N. are used by the transition player only and have a constant delay.
Theorem 3.2 Has a non-singleton Sink is PSPACE-hard for weighted con-
gestion games.
This results follows from the proof of Theorem 3.1 and the following Lemma.
The Lemma implies that there is at most one unique non-singleton sink equilib-
rium in the constructed game.
Lemma 3.3 Every non-singleton Sink equilibrium contains a strategy profile in
which the clock player is on Trigger, the main player on Wait and all control
players on their Zero strategy.
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Proof: If no player has delay M or greater, the game converges as described
above and eventually reaches a strategy profile in which the clock player is on
Trigger, the main player on Wait and all controll players on their Zero strategy.
Note that no strategy profile with a player having delayM or greater is reachable.
If players have delay of M or greater, there is a sequence of improvement steps
such that no player has delay of M or more, e.g. each control or configuration
player with delay of M changes to another strategy. 2
Thus, every non-singleton sink equilibrium also contains the strategy profile
that corresponds to the initial configuration of M ′. Therefore, there is a unique
sink equilibrium if and only if M rejects x.
3.4 Player-Specific Congestion Games
Theorem 3.4 In a Sink is PSPACE-hard for player-specific congestion games.
Proof: One can easily replace the clock player in the construction which is
the only player with non-uniform weight by a player with weight 1 and modify
the (player-specific) delay functions as follows. For the transition player the re-
source TriggerMain has delay 0 if one player allocates it and delay 100 otherwise.
For the clock player the resource TriggerMain has always delay 100. The delay
functions of the resource TriggerClock is identical for both players. It has delay 0
if one player allocates the resource and delay 20 for two or more players. For each
strategy profile the delay for each player is identical to the delay in the previous
example. 2
Theorem 3.5 Has a non-singleton Sink is PSPACE-hard for player-specific
congestion games.
Proof: This result follows by the same argument as for Theorem 3.2. 2
3.5 Anonymous Games
Next, we consider anonymous games with constant-size strategy set and show that
in a sink for this game is also PSPACE-complete. Interestingly, the existence of
pure Nash equilibria in anonymous games can be decided efficiently. This is in
sharp contrast to all other games that we consider.
Theorem 3.6 In a Sink is PSPACE-hard for anonymous games with constant-
size strategy sets.
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Proof: We give a reduction from the halting problem of a space bounded
Turing machine M ′ as defined in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Additionally, we
assume that states of M ′ are denoted by q′0, . . . , qm where qm is the halting state.
We construct an anonymous game with a constant number of strategies. Each
player has a set of allowed strategies. Every strategy that is not allowed always
has utility 0. The only other utility values in the game are 1 and 2. Given a
strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sk), let |si| denote the number of players that play
strategy si.
The game consists of the three types of configuration players and five types
of auxiliary players and two control players. The strategy choices of the config-
uration players can be mapped to configurations of the TM M ′. The game is
constructed such that every sequence of improvement moves can be partitioned
into rounds. Each round simulates one step of M ′. At the end of a round i,
let ci be the configuration obtained from the strategy profile of the configuration
players. Then, for every sequence of rounds, c1, c2, c3, . . . corresponds to the run
of M ′ starting from c1.
We first describe the configuration players before we describe the remaining
players and the process that simulates one step of M ′. The first type of con-
figuration players are |Q| identical state players that choose between the two
strategies state1 and state0. For j = |state1| corresponds to M ′ being in state
qj . The second type are t
′ identical position players that choose between the two
strategies position1 and position0. For p = |position1| corresponds to the head of
M ′ being in position p. The third type are the cell players cell0, . . . ,cellt′ which
choose between the strategies cell0, cell1, cellb, and change. Unlike the previous
two types of players, the cell players are non-identical, i.e., each player has a dif-
ferent payoff function. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ t′, player celli on strategy cell0 (cell1 or
cellb) corresponds to the fact that tape cell i contains the symbol 0 (1 or blank).
There are five types of auxiliary players and two control players. All play-
ers and their allowed strategies are listed in Figure 3.8. The utility functions
for each player are described in the Figures 3.9. The players tape1, . . . , tapet′
have identical payoff functions. They are used to evaluate symbol at the current
position. The player symbol saves this symbol. The players new-sym, new-
pos1, . . . , new-post′ , new-state1, . . . , new-statem calculate the changes to the con-
figuration. The control players ensure that strategy changes happen in a certain
order that corresponds to one step of M ′.
Lemma 3.7 Let c be a configuration of M ′ and c′ the successor configuration.
Every sequence of improvement steps from a strategy profile in which the con-
figuration players play corresponding to c and the first control player is on init,
reaches a strategy profile in which the configuration players play corresponding to
c′ and the first control player is on init.
Proof: We now describe this sequence of improvement steps which we call a
round. It is listed in Figure 3.10 in detail. One can easily check for each of the
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Players allowed strategies
cell1, . . . , cellt′ cell
0,cell1, cellb, change
position1, . . . ,positiont′ position
1, position0
state1, . . . , statem state
1, state0
tape1, . . . , tapet′ tape
0, tape1, tapeb
symbol symbol0,symbol1,symbolb
new-sym new-sym0,new-sym1, new-symb
new-pos1, . . . ,new-post′ new-pos
1, new-pos0
new-state1, . . . ,new-statem new-state
1, new-state0
transition1 init, tape-change, eval-tape, new-sym, new-sym2,
new-pos,new-pos2, new-state, new-state2, halt
transition2 Xinit, Xtape-change, Xeval-tape, Xnew-sym,
Xnew-sym2, Xnew-pos Xnew-pos2, Xnew-state,
Xnew-state2
Figure 3.8: Players and their allowed strategies, i.e., strategies with utility 1 or
2.
strategy profiles that the next one is essentially unique.
In a round, the first control player successively changes through his strategies
(c.f. steps (2),(4),...). The second control player follows his choices in his cor-
responding strategies. By construction of the payoff function, this ensures that
the control players only change their strategies in a certain order. Each of these
steps of the first control player is interrupted by improvement steps of subsets
of configuration or auxiliary players. The utility functions (cf. Figure 3.9) are
designed in such a way that these improvement steps are possible if and only
if the control player plays the corresponding strategy. Additionally, the control
player may only continue with his next step after these other player have changed
their strategies.
We now describe the improvement steps of the configuration and auxiliary
players only.
• Consider any strategy profile of the configuration players and assume the
first control player is on init (strategy profile (1) in Figure 3.10).
• The t′ tape players change to a strategy profile in that the number of players
on tape0, tape1, and tapeb equals the number of players on cell0, cell1, and
cellb (2).
• The player celli with i = |positioni| changes to his strategy to change (4).
• The symbol player changes to symbol0, symbol1, or symbolb depending on
which strategy was left by the player celli (6). This can be coded into the
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utility function by evaluating the difference of number of players in the cell
and tape strategies.
• The player new-symbol changes to the strategy new-symbolσ
′
where σ′ cor-
responds to the new symbol (8). This can be coded as a function as from
number of players on symbol0, symbol1, symbolb, and state1.
• The player celli changes to the strategy cellσ
′
(10).
• Exactly i′ players choose new-pos1 where i′ is the new position of M ′ (12).
• The players position change their strategies such that |position1| = |new-
pos1| = i′ (14).
• Exactly q′ players new-state choose new-state1 where qq′ is the new state of
M ′ (16).
• The players state change their strategies such that |state1| = |new-state1| =
q′ (18).
The configuration players’ strategy profile now corresponds to the new configu-
ration after one step of M ′.
2
Now, let s be any strategy profile that corresponds to the initial configuration
of M ′. That is all cell players are on cell0, all position players except position1
are on position0, all state players are on state0, and the player control1 is in init.
All other players may play an arbitrary strategy. Then, s is in a non trivial sink
equilibrium, if and only if M ′ does not halt. 2
Theorem 3.8 Has a non-singleton Sink is PSPACE-hard for anonymous
games.
Proof: It suffices to show that every non-singleton sink equilibrium of the
anonymous games that we constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.6 contains a
strategy profile s that corresponds to the initial configuration M ′. Note, that by
construction of M ′, it suffices to show that every non-singleton sink equilibrium
a strategy profile that corresponds to an arbitrary configuration of M ′. That is,
a state in which player control1 is on init.
By construction of the utility functions (cf. Figure 3.9) every infinite sequence
of improvement moves, and thus every non-singleton sink equilibrium, contains
infinite moves of control1. By construction of the utility functions of control1
and control2 this implies that control1 eventually reaches init. 2
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Player strategy partitions with utility 2
celli change |tape-change| 6= 0 and |position
1| = i
cell0 |new-tape| 6= 0 and |new-sym0| > 0
cell1 |new-tape| 6= 0 and |new-sym1| > 0
cellb |new-tape| 6= 0 and |new-symb| > 0
tapei tape
0 |init| 6= 0 and |cell0| > |tape0|
tape1 |init| 6= 0 and |cell1| > |tape1|
tapeb |init| 6= 0 and |cellb| > |tapeb|
symbol symbol0 |eval-tape| 6= 0 and |cell0|-|tape0| < 0
symbol1 |eval-tape| 6= 0 and |cell1|-|tape1| < 0
symbolb |eval-tape| 6= 0 and |cellb|-|tapeb| < 0
new-sym new-sym0 |new-symbol| 6= 0 and if 0 is new symbol
new-sym1 |new-symbol| 6= 0 and if 1 is new symbol
new-symb |new-symbol| 6= 0 and if b is new symbol
new-pos new-pos1 |new-pos| 6= 0 and |new-pos1| < new position
new-pos0 |new-pos| 6= 0 and |new-pos1| > new position
new-state new-state1 |new-state| 6= 0 and |new-state1| > new state
new-state0 |new-state| 6= 0 and |new-state1| < new state
position position1 |new-pos2| 6= 0 and |position1| < |new-pos1|
position0 |new-pos2| 6= 0 and |position1| > |new-pos1|
state state1 |new-state2| 6= 0 and |state1| < |new-state1|
state0 |new-state2| 6= 0 and |state1| > |new-state1|
control1 tape-change |Xinit| > 0 and |cell0| = |tape0| and |cell1| = |tape1|
and |cellb| = |tapeb|
eval-tape |Xtape-change| > 0 and |cell-change| = 1
new-sym |Xeval-tape| > 0 and |cell0|+ |symbol0| = |tape0| and
|cell1|+ |symbol1| = |tape1| and |cellb|+ |symbolb| = |tapeb|
new-sym2 |Xnew-sym| > 0 and |new-symσ
′
| = 1 for σ′ = new symbol
new-pos |Xnew-sym2| > 0 and |change| = 0
new-pos2 |Xnew-pos| > 0 and |new-pos1| = new position
new-state |Xnew-pos2| > 0 and d |position1| = |new-pos1|
new-state2 |Xnew-state| > 0 and |new-state1| = new state
init |Xnew-state2| > 0 and |state1| = |new-state1|
stop |state1| = m
control2 Xinit |init| > 0
Xtape-change |tape-change| > 0
Xeval-tape |eval-tape| > 0
Xnew-sym |new-sym| > 0
Xnew-sym2 |new-sym2| > 0
Xnew-pos |new-pos| > 0
Xnew-pos2 |new-pos2| > 0
Xnew-state |new-state| > 0
Xnew-state2 |new-state2| > 0
Figure 3.9: The strategy partition combinations are listed that induce utility 2.
All other allowed combinations have utility 1. Note that the new symbol, new po-
sition, and new state can be coded as a function of |symbol0|,|symbol1|,|symbolb|,
and |state1|.
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Configuration players tape symbol new-sym new-pos new-state control1 control2
1 (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σi, σi+1 . . . σt′), q, i * * * * * init *
2 (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σi, σi+1 . . . σt′), q, i p0, p1, pb * * * * init Xinit
3 (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σi, σi+1 . . . σt′), q, i p0, p1, pb * * * * tape-change Xinit
4 (σ1, . . . , σi−1, change, σi+1 . . . σt′), q, i p0, p1, pb ∗ * * * tape-change Xtape-change
5 (σ1, . . . , σi−1, change, σi+1 . . . σt′), q, i p0, p1, pb ∗ * * * eval-tape Xtape-change
6 (σ1, . . . , σi−1, change, σi+1 . . . σt′), q, i p0, p1, pb σi * * * eval-tape Xeval-tape
7 (σ1, . . . , σi−1, change, σi+1 . . . σt′), q, i p0, p1, pb σi * * * new-sym Xeval-tape
8 (σ1, . . . , σi−1, change, σi+1 . . . σt′), q, i p0, p1, pb σi σ′ * * new-sym Xnew-sym
9 (σ1, . . . , σi−1, change, σi+1 . . . σt′), q, i p0, p1, pb σi σ′ * * new-sym2 Xnew-sym
10 (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σ′, σi+1 . . . σt′), q, i p0, p1, pb σi σ′ * * new-sym2 Xnew-sym2
11 (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σ′, σi+1 . . . σt′), q, i p0, p1, pb σi σ′ * * new-pos Xnew-sym
12 (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σ′, σi+1 . . . σt′), q, i p0, p1, pb σi σ′ i′ * new-pos Xnew-pos
13 (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σ′, σi+1 . . . σt′), q, i p0, p1, pb σi σ′ i′ * new-pos2 Xnew-pos
14 (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σ′, σi+1 . . . σt′), q, i′ p0, p1, pb σi σ′ i′ * new-pos2 Xnew-pos2
15 (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σ′, σi+1 . . . σt′), q, i′ p0, p1, pb σi σ′ i′ * new-state Xnew-pos2
16 (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σ′, σi+1 . . . σt′), q, i′ p0, p1, pb σi σ′ i′ q′ new-state Xnew-state
17 (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σ′, σi+1 . . . σt′), q, i′ p0, p1, pb σi σ′ i′ q′ new-state2 Xnew-state
18 (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σ′, σi+1 . . . σt′), q′, i′ p0, p1, pb σi σ′ i′ q′ new-state2 Xnew-state2
19 (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σ′, σi+1 . . . σt′), q′, i′ p0, p1, pb σi σ′ i′ q′ init Xnew-state2
Figure 3.10: This figure shows the sequence of strategy profiles during one round. A strategy profile is described es follows.
The strategy profile of the cell players is given as a vector σ ∈ {0, 1, b, change}t
′
where σi denotes strategy cell
σi for player
celli. For the state, position, new-pos, new-state players, we give the number of players on state
1, position1, new-pos1,
and new-state1, respectively. The strategy profile of the tape players is described by a vector p ∈ {0, . . . , t′}3 that denotes
the number of players on tape0,tape1, and tapeb, respectively. For the players symbol and new-sym, σ denotes strategy
symbolσ and new-symσ , respectively. The round starts with each player celli on σi ∈ {0, 1, b} , q state players on state1, i
position players on position1 and the first control player on init. The underlined strategies indicate the players that have
an incentive to deviate from their current strategies.
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Chapter 4
Strong Equilibria
In this chapter, we examine the computational complexity of strong equilibria
in games related to congestion and load balancing. In particular, we consider
problems of the following types. Existence: Does a given game have a strong
equilibrium? Recognition: Is a given state of a game a strong equilibrium? Com-
putation: If a game has a strong equilibrium, can we compute it in polynomial
time? In general, our results shed light on the inherent complexity of cooperation
and show that the predictive value of coalitional stability concepts in many of
these games is rather questionable. While in some cases, we can give efficient
algorithms, most of our insights turn out to be hardness results. We begin with
an introduction in Section 4.1 and summarize our results in Section 4.2. In Sec-
tion 4.3 we start the most general class of succinct games in the focus of this thesis.
We answer the above questions for anonymous games. In Section 4.4 we restrict
the class of games towards player-specific games and in Section 4.5 to congestion
games. In Section 4.6 we investigate bottleneck congestion games. Interestingly,
for this class of games, the existence of strong equilibria is guaranteed.
4.1 Introduction
A central theme of (algorithmic) game theory is the study and analysis of equilib-
ria to predict the outcomes of interacting rational agents. While this is intriguing
by itself, it yields numerous benefits, e.g., for the design and implementation of
regulations such as laws in society or protocols in distributed systems. In strate-
gic games the most frequently studied concept of stability is the Nash equilibrium
– a state, in which no agent has an incentive to unilaterally deviate. The analysis
of Nash equilibria has occupied a central place in game theory since its begin-
ning. More recently, the computational complexity of Nash equilibria has been
analyzed to determine whether the concept is reasonable from a computational
point of view [FPT04,ARV08].
Much of the attractiveness of the Nash equilibrium stems from its elegance and
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simplicity and (in the mixed case) from guaranteed existence. However, a Nash
equilibrium is only resilient against unilateral deviations. It neglects the aspect
of cooperation or coordination between agents. Obviously, in many scenarios
agents have an incentive to cooperate, as cooperation often allows to dramatically
improve the situation of every participant. In these cases, the negligence of
this aspect in Nash equilibrium significantly hurts the explanatory power and
predictive value of this concept in practice.
This shortcoming of Nash equilibria has been addressed already in the 1950s,
most notably by Aumann [Aum59] who introduced the strong equilibrium – a
state, from which no coalition of agents can jointly deviate and thereby strictly
improve all members of the coalition. Strong equilibria include the consideration
of cooperation, but this comes at the expense of guaranteed existence. Hence,
using strong equilibria we can make better predictions about the outcome in
many but not all games. In addition, strong equilibria have recently been shown
to exhibit a significantly smaller inefficiency in congestion and load balancing
games [CS09,AFM09].
4.2 Our Results
In Section 4.3 we study anonymous games [Blo99,Blo00], in which the cost of a
player does not depend on the identity of the other players. A notable case are
games with a constant number of strategies, in which the existence of pure Nash
equilibria can be decided efficiently [BFH09], and for mixed Nash equilibria there
exists an FPTAS [DP07,DP08]. In this case, we can decide the recognition prob-
lem efficiently for strong equilibria. Our algorithm uses computation of perfect
matchings together with careful enumeration to find a coalition and a profitable
deviation if they exist. Deciding the existence problem for strong equilibria for a
given anonymous game, however, is strongly NP-hard, even for a small constant
number of strategies.
An important class of anonymous games are cases of load balancing, i.e.,
player-specific singleton congestion games [Mil96]. Previous work [KLBW97] has
shown existence for such games with non-decreasing cost functions. However, we
are not aware of any result providing efficient algorithms to compute strong equi-
libria. We show in Section 4.4 how to obtain a strong equilibrium in polynomial
time and how to recognize a given state as a strong equilibrium. Interestingly,
our results imply that there always exist sequences of coalitional improvement
moves to a strong equilibrium that are of polynomial length, and we show how
to obtain the corresponding deviations for the players efficiently.
In Section 4.5 we consider regular congestion games [Ros73] with special struc-
ture. In regular congestion games it has been shown that strong equilibria can
be absent [HLY97], and a characterization result has been given that describes
structures of strategy spaces that always allow strong equilibria for any set of
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non-decreasing latency functions. An extension of strong equilibria to correlated
strategies has been considered in [RT06]. In regular matroid and symmetric net-
work games Nash equilibria can be computed efficiently [FPT04, ARV08]. We
here treat regular congestion games and aim to draw a more detailed picture
beyond the characterization of [HLY97]. Unfortunately, even when the strategy
space has simultaneously a symmetric network and matroid structure, the exis-
tence problem for strong equilibria is strongly co-NP-hard. This is particularly
interesting in light of the positive results in related work mentioned above. Addi-
tionally, we can even show weak NP-hardness for such games that have only two
players. This directly implies the hardness result also for k-strong equilibria (in
which only coalitions of size at most k are allowed), for any k ≥ 2.
In Section 4.6, we consider the model of bottleneck congestion games, for
which Harks et al. [HKM09] establish the finite improvement property via a
lexicographic potential function. Interestingly, they are able to extend these con-
ditions to hold even if coalitions of players are allowed to change their strategy
in a coordinated way. This implies that bottleneck congestion games do admit
strong equilibria. In Section 4.6.1 we focus on computing strong equilibria of
bottleneck congestion games using a (centralized) algorithm. Our first main re-
sult is a generic algorithm that computes a strong equilibrium for any bottleneck
congestion game. The algorithm iteratively decreases capacities on the resources
and relies on a strategy packing oracle. The oracle decides if a given set of capac-
ities allows to pack a collection of feasible strategies for all players and outputs
a feasible packing if one exists. The running time of the algorithm is essen-
tially determined by the running time of this oracle. In Section 4.6.2 we show
that there are polynomial time oracles for matroids, a-arborescences, and single-
commodity networks. Thus, our generic algorithm yields an efficient algorithm to
compute a strong equilibrium for the corresponding classes of games. For general
games, however, we show that the problem of computing a strong equilibrium is
NP-hard, even in two-commodity networks. In Section 4.6.3 we study the dura-
tion and complexity of sequential improvement dynamics that converge to strong
equilibria. We show that it is NP-hard to decide if a coalitional improving move
exists, even for matroid and single-commodity network games, and even if the
deviating coalition is fixed a priori. This highlights an interesting contrast for
these two classes of games: While there are polynomial time algorithms to com-
pute a strong equilibrium, it is impossible to decide efficiently if a given state is
a strong equilibrium – the decision problem is co-NP-hard. In addition, we show
that there exist games and starting states, from which every sequence of improve-
ment moves to a strong equilibrium is exponentially long if moves of coalitions
of size O(n1−ǫ) are allowed, for any constant ǫ > 0. Finally, we observe that all
of these hardness results generalize to the computation of α-approximate strong
equilibria, for any polynomially bounded factor α. An α-approximate strong
equilibrium is a relaxation of a strong equilibrium, which is stable only against
coalitional improving moves that decrease the delay of every moving player by at
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least a factor of α > 1.
4.3 Anonymous Games
We start by considering the case of anonymous games with a constant number
of strategies. In this case we can decide efficiently if a given state S is a strong
equilibrium.
Theorem 4.1 A state S of an anonymous game with a constant number of
strategies can be recognized as a strong equilibrium in polynomial time.
Proof: We show here that we can efficiently compute a profitable deviation
if it exists. For the given state S let l(S) denote the load profile of S. For a
given (possibly different) load profile l we present an algorithm that checks in
polynomial time if there exists a profitable joint deviation s to a state that has
load profile l. The algorithm repeatedly tries to compute a perfect matching in a
bipartite graph. By running this algorithm for s and all polynomially many load
profiles l, the theorem follows.
For a given state S and a given load profile l, we construct a bipartite de-
viation graph G and search for a perfect matching. The vertex set of graph
G = (A ∪ B,F ) is defined by A = {vi | for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and B = {ve,j |
for all e ∈ E and 1 ≤ j ≤ le}. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n and resource e ∈ E, we add
all the edges (vi, ve,j) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ le if and only if ci(e, l) < ci(si, l(S)). In
addition there is an edge (vi, vsi) for every player 1 ≤ i ≤ n and his current
strategy si.
Note that a perfect matching in this graph yields an assignment of players
to strategies. From this we can derive a new state S ′ by setting s′i = e if and
only if (vi, ve,j) is in the matching for some 1 ≤ j ≤ le. This state S
′ represents
an improvement for all players i with si 6= s′i. Therefore, if there is a profitable
coalitional deviation from S to a state S ′ with l(S) 6= l(S ′), the algorithm finds
at least one such deviation. Observe, that for l = l(S) the algorithm may return
S itself. To check if there is a deviation to a strategy S ′ 6= S with l(S) = l(S ′),
we run the algorithm n times with S and l as input. However, in the i-th run,
we force player i to change his strategy by removing edge (vi, vsi). Thus, if there
is a profitable deviation to a state S ′ 6= S with l(S) = l(S ′), then there will exist
a perfect matching in at least one of the runs, and thereby we will find such a
deviation. 2
While we can decide for a given state whether it is a strong equilibrium or
not, the problem of deciding the existence of an strong equilibrium is NP-hard.
Theorem 4.2 It is NP-hard to decide if an anonymous game with a constant
number of strategies has strong equilibrium.
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Proof: We prove the result by a reduction from 3Sat. Given a formula ϕ
with the variables x1, . . . , xn and clauses c1, . . . , cm, we construct an anonymous
game Γϕ with players X
0
i , X
1
i , C
k
j (for 1 ≤ j ≤ m and 1 ≤ k ≤ 10j), V
k
i
(for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ k ≤ 10i + 10m), Prisoner1, and Prisoner2. The set of
strategies is {On, Off, Verify, False, Wait, Cooperate, Defect}. The cost functions
are depicted in Figure 4.1.
Player Strategy Load profile Cost
Xbi On |On| = n and |Off| = n 2
1 ≤ i ≤ n On Otherwise 3
b ∈ {0, 1} Off |On| = n and |Off| = n 1
Off Otherwise 3
False |False| ∈ {10j + 3 | if xi = b does
not satisfy cj} 1
False |False| = 10m+ 10i+ 2 1
False Otherwise 4
Ckj Verify 2
1 ≤ j ≤ m False |False| = 10j + 3 1
1 ≤ k ≤ 10j False Otherwise 3
V ki Verify 2
1 ≤ i ≤ n False |False| = 10m+ 10i+ 2 1
1 ≤ k ≤ 10j + 10m False Otherwise 3
Prisoner1, Prisoner2 Cooperate |False| = 0 5
Cooperate |False| 6= 0 and |Cooperate| = 2 2
Cooperate |False| 6= 0 and |Cooperate| 6= 2 4
Defect |False| = 0 5
Defect |False| 6= 0 and |Defect| = 2 3
Defect |False| 6= 0 and |Cooperate| 6= 2 1
Figure 4.1: Description of the cost functions in the game Γϕ. Strategies that are
not listed here have cost of 6 and, therefore, are never played in equilibrium.
If ϕ is satisfiable, let b1, . . . , bn be a satisfying assignment. The following state
is a strong equilibrium. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the player Xbii plays On and the
player X1−bii plays Off. All players C
k
j and V
k
i play Verify and players Prisoner1
and Prisoner2 play Cooperate.
We show that there is no coalition that can improve by jointly deviating to
another state. The players X1−bii are playing Off and have the minimal possible
payoff of 1. Thus, they cannot be part of a deviating coalition. The player
Prisoner1 and Prisoner2 can improve only if some other players move to False.
We will show, this cannot happen.
For the remaining players, i.e., Xbii , C
k
j ,V
k
i it the only possible profitable
deviation is to deviate to False. Clearly, if there is a deviation of a subset of
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these players, it must result in 10j + 3 (for 1 ≤ j ≤ m) or 10m + 10i + 2 (for
1 ≤ i ≤ n) players on False. We consider the former case. Assume there is
a deviation of a coalition of some of the players that results in 10j′ + 3 many
player on False. The coalition must contain the players C1j′, . . . , C
10j′
j′ and the
three players Xbii with xi appearing in clause cj. However, let xi∗ be a variable
that satisfies cj with xi∗ = bi∗ . Player X
b∗i
i∗ does not improve by deviation to
False. Therefore, no such deviation can exist. Similarly, there is no deviation of
a coalition that yields 10m + 10i′ + 2 (for 1 ≤ i′ ≤ n) players on False. This is
only possible if for some 1 ≤ i′ ≤ n both players X0i′ and X
1
i′ are on strategy On.
Now, assume ϕ is not satisfiable and there is a strategy profile S that is a
strong equilibrium.
We first show that in S no player is on False. If some player is on False,
the players Prisoner1 and Prisoner2 play a game corresponding to the prisoners
dilemma. This game does not admit a strong equilibrium and implies that in S
no player can be on False.
Now since S is a equilibrium, there are exactly n players Xbi on On and exactly
n players Xbi on Off because otherwise they would have cost of 3. There is no
1 ≤ i′ ≤ n with both players X0i′ and X
1
i′ being on strategy On. Otherwise, those
two players and and the players V 1i′ , . . . , V
10m+10i′
i′ could jointly change to False
an decrease their costs. Now, let Xb11 , . . . , X
bn
n be the players on On. Since ϕ is
not satisfiable, the assignment b1, . . . , bn implied by the players on On creates at
least one clause cj′ that is not satisfied. Let xi′ , xi′′ , and xi′′′ be the three variables
of this clause. Then, the players X
bi′
i′ , X
bi′′
i′′ , X
bi′′′
i′′′ , and the player C
1
j′, . . . , C
10j′
j′
could jointly change to False an decrease their costs. This is a contradiction to
the assumption that S is a strong equilibrium and completes our reduction. 2
Note that this implies that further restrictions on the games are necessary in
order to decide existence or compute a strong equilibrium efficiently. We consider
games with a constant number of player types, i.e., where each player has one
out of a constant number of different cost functions.
Corollary 4.3 In anonymous games with constant number of strategies that are
(1) symmetric or (2) have only a constant number of different player types we can
decide efficiently ifstrong equilibria exist and compute one efficiently if it exists.
Note that for symmetric games the assignment of players in a load profile
is irrelevant, hence we can use our algorithm from Theorem 4.1 above to check
each of the polynomial number of profiles for being a strong equilibrium For a
constant number of player types, the number of essentially different assignments
that can be derived from a single load profile is a polynomial number. Again,
by enumeration and application of our algorithm we can decide existence and
compute strong equilibria efficiently.
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4.4 Player-Specific Singleton Congestion Games
In this section we treat player-specific singleton congestion games. For games
with non-decreasing cost functions it is known that strong equilibria always ex-
ist [KLBW97]. Here we provide efficient algorithms to compute a strong equilib-
rium and decide whether a given state is a strong equilibrium. To the best of our
knowledge these results have not been described in the literature before.
Theorem 4.4 In player-specific singleton congestion games with non-decreasing
cost functions we can in polynomial time (1) decide whether a given state is a
strong equilibrium and (2) compute a strong equilibrium in polynomial time.
Proof: Obviously, a state S that is a strong equilibrium must be a Nash equi-
librium. Consider a Nash equilibrium S and the corresponding load profile l(S).
Because cost functions are non-decreasing, every profitable coalitional deviation
must result in a state S ′ with the same load profile l(S). In particular, if the
load profile changes to l(S ′) 6= l(S), there must be a resource e with higher load
le(S
′) > le(S). Consider a player moving to e. Any player moving to e does not
make a strict improvement, because otherwise he could move there unilaterally
– a contradiction to S being a Nash equilibrium. Hence, whenever we have a
Nash equilibrium, there must be a strong equilibrium with the same load profile,
a fact that was observed in [KLBW97]. In particular, every profitable coalitional
deviation represents a circular switch of players and thereby decreases the sum
of player costs.
This allows to use our algorithm presented for anonymous games in Theo-
rem 4.1 above to decide for a given state S whether it is a strong equilibrium.
Note that due to the arbitrary number of strategies, there is a possibly expo-
nential number of load profiles. Here we can first make sure that S is a Nash
equilibrium, then we only have to check one load profile – namely l(S) – to verify
that no coalitional deviation exists. In this way we can efficiently check whether
a state is a strong equilibrium.
For the task of computing a strong equilibrium, we note that there are efficient
algorithms to compute a Nash equilibrium in these games [Mil96]. This allows
us to obtain a Nash equilibrium S and load profile l(S) in polynomial time. To
compute a strong equilibrium, we construct a bipartite deviation graph G for
state s and target profile l(S) as in the proof of Theorem 4.1. Here we also
add costs to the edges, and let the cost of edge (vi, ve,j) be ci(le(S)), for all
1 ≤ j ≤ le(S). Now consider any other state S ′ with l(S), in which ci(S) = ci(S ′)
for every player i with si = s
′
i and ci(S) > ci(S
′) for every i with si 6= s′i. Note
that for every such state we can find a corresponding perfect matching in G. In
particular, we construct a minimum cost perfect matching. This matching yields
a state S ′ and we now argue that S ′ is indeed a strong equilibrium.
Suppose for contradiction that there is a coalitional deviation from S ′ to a
state S ′′. S is a Nash equilibrium and ci(S) ≥ ci(S ′) ≥ ci(S ′′) for every i ∈ N ,
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with at least inequality for a moving player. So S ′′ must also have load profile l(S).
Thus, the deviation from S ′ must be a circular switch of players. This switch does
not increase the cost of any player but decrease the cost of the moving players.
Therefore, the assignment S ′′ is such that ci(S) = ci(S ′′) for every player i with
si = s
′′
i and ci(S) > ci(S
′′) for every i with si 6= s′′i . Note that S
′′ corresponds to a
perfect matching in G, and the sum of costs
∑
i∈N ci(S
′′) <
∑
i∈N ci(S
′). This is
a contradiction to S ′ being derived from a minimum cost perfect matching inG. 2
Interestingly, our proof shows that for every Nash equilibrium there is a sin-
gle coalitional deviation that turns the state into a strong equilibrium. Milch-
taich [Mil96] proved that from every state S there is a sequence of unilateral
deviations with length at most |E| ·
(
n+1
2
)
that leads to a Nash equilibrium. Our
result implies that even strong equilibrium can be reached via short sequences
of improvement moves from every state of the game. In these sequences we only
need one coalitional move which is efficiently computable.
Corollary 4.5 For every state s of a player-specific singleton congestion game
with non-decreasing cost functions there is a sequence of coalitional improvement
moves that leads to a strong equilibrium. Each move can be computed in polyno-
mial time. The length of the sequence is at most |E| ·
(
n+1
2
)
+ 1.
4.5 Congestion Games
In this section, we consider the complexity of computing strong equilibria in
general congestion games. The class of singleton congestion games is a special case
of the games we treated in the previous section, and for which we could establish a
variety of positive results. Here we extend the combinatorial structure of strategy
spaces only slightly to matroids. This allows to obtain a set of quite strong
hardness results concerning the existence and recognition of strong equilibria.
Note that all our results in this section hold even for symmetric games, in which
strategy spaces are simultaneously matroids and networks.
Theorem 4.6 It is strongly co-NP-hard to decide (1) if a congestion game has
a strong equilibrium and (2) if a given state of a game is a strong equilibrium.
Proof: We reduce from 3-Partition. An instance is given by a multiset
of integers a1, . . . , a3m. Let B =
1
m
∑3m
i=1 ai. An instance I = (a1, . . . , a3m) ∈
3-Partition if and only if there exists a partition of A = {1, . . . , 3m} into m
subsets A1, . . . , Am such that the sum
∑
i∈Aj ai = B for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Without
loss of generality, we can assume that every integer B/2 > ai > B/4. Therefore,
each subset Ai is forced to consist of exactly three elements.
Given an instance I, we construct a symmetric matroid network congestion
game ΓI as follows. The network isG = (V,E) with vertices V = {s, v1, . . . , v3m, t}
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Figure 4.2: Construction that proves hardness of the existence and recognition
problems of strong equilibria in congestion games.
and and a series of parallel edges as depicted in Figure 4.2. There are n+1 play-
ers. Each players’ source node is s and his target node is t. The delay functions
are defined as follows. Let M = 2B and 1 > ǫ > 0. The delay of an edge a−i is
M − ai for one player and M for more than one player. Delay of an edge a
+
i is
always M + ai. The delay of an edge a
0
i is M for at most n− 1 players and 2M
for n or more players. Delay of edge b− is M − b − ǫ for at most n players and
M for more than n players. Delay of an edge b+ is always M + b− ǫ.
If I ∈ 3-Partition, we show that no strong equilibrium exists. Observe that
for a single agent it is never optimal to choose one of the edges a+i or b
+. Thus,
no strong equilibrium exists in which these edges are used. Thus, in every strong
equilibrium every player has delay of (at least) (n + 1)M . However, there is a
joint deviation of all players which yields delay of (n+1)M − ǫ for each of them.
Let A1, . . . , Am be a solution of the 3-Partition-instance I. Player n+1 choses
edge b+ and edges a−1 , . . . , a
−
3m. Each player 1 ≤ j ≤ n chooses edge b
− and the
following edges: For each 1 ≤ i ≤ 3m, if i ∈ Aj player j plays edge a
+
i otherwise
he players a0i . As argued above, the resulting state is not a strong equilibrium
either. Thus, no strong equilibrium exists.
If I 6∈ 3-Partition, all players choosing path b−, a−1 , a
−
2 , . . . , a
−
3m is a strong
equilibrium. Assume for contradiction that there is a profitable deviation for a
coalition. This implies that the sum of their delays also improves. If players
deviate by leaving from the edges a−i this sum cannot decrease. Therefore, a
deviation must include a deviation to the edge b+. Without loss of generality let
this be player n + 1. Now, for player n + 1 this deviation is only profitable if
he stays on the edges a−1 , . . . , a
−
3m while all other players are not on these edges.
This implies for the remaining n players and each 1 ≤ i ≤ 3m that (at least) one
player has to choose edge a+i and (at most) n − 1 players choose edge a
0
i . For
1 ≤ j ≤ m let Aj = {i | player j is on a
+
i }. Hence, the deviation is profitable
only if for all player 1 ≤ j ≤ m the following holds:
∑
i∈Aj ai ≤ b. Since we have
that
⋃m
j=1Aj = {1, . . . , 3m}, we obtain
∑
i∈Aj ai = b which is a contradiction to
the assumption that I 6∈ 3-Partition.
Obviously, the above implies that the strategy profile s with all players choos-
ing path b−, a−1 , a
−
2 , . . . , a
−
3m is a strong equilibrium if and only if I 6∈ 3-Partition.
This proves co-NP-hardness of deciding whether a given state is a strong equilib-
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Figure 4.3: Construction that proves hardness of the existence and recognition
problems of 2-strong equilibria in congestion games.
rium. 2
Theorem 4.7 It is weakly co-NP-hard to decide (1) if a congestion game with
two players has a strong equilibrium and (2) if a given state of a game is a strong
equilibrium.
Proof:
We essentially use the same construction as in Theorem 4.6. This time we
reduce from a version of SubSetSum−: An instance is given by a set of natural
numbers a1, . . . , am, and b. An instance I = (a1, . . . , am, b) ∈ SubSetSum
− if
and only if there exists a vector (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}m with
∑m
i=1 xiai = b.
It is easy to show that this problem is weakly NP-complete.
Given an instance of SubSetSum− we construct a network congestion game
as above. The network is G = (V,E) with V = {v1, . . . , vm, t} and and a series
of parallel edges as depicted in Figure 4.3. For the delay we use a large number
M > 3
∑m
i=1 ai. The delay of an edge ai is M − ai for one player and M for more
than one player. The delay of an edge a′i is always M + ai. The delay of edge b
is M − b− ǫ for one player and M for more than one player. Delay of an edge b′
is always M + b− ǫ.
If I /∈ SubSetSum, the state S in which both players choose the upper path,
i.e., the edges a1, . . . , am, and b is a strong equilibrium. Note that both players
have delay (m + 1)M . Obviously, there is no improving deviation for a single
player. For a joint deviation, observe that every improvement must include a
deviation of one of the players to edge b′. Adequate compensation of his higher
delay incurred by using this edge is only possible if the other player deviates to
some of the edges a′i. This, however, is not possible due to the assumption.
If the instance I ∈ SubSetSum−, consider any other state than S. Note that
each player unilaterally has an incentive to switch to the upper path, hence no
such state can be a Nash equilibrium. Now let {x1, . . . , xm} ∈ {−1, 0, 1}m with∑m
i=1 xiai = b. The following state is a profitable deviation for both players from
s. The first player chooses the edges ai with xi = 0 or xi = 1 and a
′
i for xi = −1.
He also chooses edge b′. The second player chooses the edges ai for xi = 0 or
4.6. BOTTLENECK CONGESTION GAMES 55
xi = −1 and a′i for xi = 1. Finally, he also chooses edge b. Then the delay of the
first player is ∑
i:xi=1
(M − ai) +
∑
i:xi=0
M +
∑
i:xi=−1
(M + ai) +M + b− ǫ
= (m+ 1)M −
n∑
i=1
xiai + b− ǫ
= (m+ 1)M − ǫ .
A similar calculation shows that the delay of the second player is also (m+1)M−ǫ.
Finally, the above arguments imply that state s is a strong equilibrium if and
only if I 6∈ SubSetSum−. This proves the theorem. 2
Additionally, it implies the result for k-strong equilibrium, for any k ≥ 2.
Corollary 4.8 It is weakly co-NP-hard to decide for a congestion game (1) if it
has a k-strong equilibrium, (2) if a given state is a k-strong equilibrium, for any
k ≥ 2.
4.6 Bottleneck Congestion Games
In this section, we investigate the complexity of computing a strong equilibria in
bottleneck congestion games. We first present a generic algorithm that computes
a strong equilibrium for an arbitrary bottleneck congestion game. It uses an
oracle that solves a strategy packing problem (see Definition 4.9), which we term
strategy packing oracle. For games in which the strategy packing oracle can be
implemented in polynomial time, we obtain a polynomial algorithm computing
a strong equilibrium. We then examine games for which this is the case. In
general, however, we prove that computing a strong equilibrium is NP-hard, even
for bottleneck network congestion games with two players.
4.6.1 The Dual Greedy.
The general approach of our algorithm is to introduce upper bounds ue (capaci-
ties) on each resource e. The idea is to iteratively reduce upper bounds of costly
resources as long as the residual capacities admit a feasible strategy packing,
see Definition 4.9 below. Our algorithm can be interpreted as a dual greedy,
or worst out algorithm as studied, e.g., in the field of network optimization, see
Schrijver [Sch03].
Definition 4.9 [Strategy packing oracle]
Input: Finite set of resources E with upper bounds (ue)e∈E, and n collections
S1, . . . ,Sn ⊆ 2
E given implicitly by a certain combinatorial property.
Output: Sets s1 ∈ S1, . . . , sn ∈ Sn such that |{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | e ∈ si}| ≤ ue for
all e ∈ E, or the information that no such sets exist.
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More specifically, when the algorithm starts, no strategy has been assigned to
any player and each resource can be used by n = |N | players, thus, ue = n. If e is
used by n players, its cost equals de(n). The algorithm now iteratively reduces the
maximum resource cost by picking a resource e′ with maximum delay de(ue) and
ue > 0. The number of players allowed on e
′ is reduced by one and the strategy
packing oracle checks, if there is a feasible strategy profile obeying the capacity
constraints. If the strategy packing oracle outputs such a feasible strategy profile
S, the algorithm reiterates by choosing a (possibly different) resource that has
currently maximum delay. If the strategy packing oracle returns ∅ after the
capacity of some e′ ∈ E was reduced to ue′ − 1, we fix the strategies of those
ue′ many players that used e
′ in the state the strategy packing oracle computed
in the previous iteration and decrease the bounds ue of all resources used in the
strategies accordingly. This ensures that e′ is frozen, i.e., there is no residual
capacity on e′ for allocating this resource in future iterations of the algorithm.
The algorithm terminates after at most n · m calls of the oracle. For a formal
description of the algorithm see Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Dual Greedy, the strategy packing oracle is denoted by O.
Input: Bottleneck congestion game Γ = (N,E, (Si)i∈N ′, (de)e∈E)
Output: Strong equilibrium of Γ
set N ′ = N , and ue = n, le = 0, for all e ∈ E and
S ′ = O(E, (Si)i∈N ′, (ue)e∈E) ;
while {e ∈ E | ue > 0} 6= ∅ do
choose e′ ∈ argmaxe∈E|ue>0{de(ue + le)} ;
ue′ := ue′ − 1 ;
if O(E, (Si)i∈N ′ , (ue)e∈E) = ∅ then
ue′ := ue′ + 1 ;
foreach j ∈ N ′ with e′ ∈ s′j do
sj := s
′
j ;
set le := le + 1, ue := ue − 1 for all e ∈ s′j ;
N ′ := N ′ \ {j} ;
end
end
S ′ = O(E, (Si)i∈N ′, (ue)e∈E) ;
end
return S ;
Theorem 4.10 Dual Greedy computes a strong equilibrium.
Proof: Let S denote the output of the algorithm. In addition, we denote by
Nk, k = 1 . . . , K, the sets of players whose strategies are determined after the
strategy packing oracle (denoted by O) returned ∅ for the k-th time. We denote
the pivotal resource for which O returns ∅ for the k-th time by ek.
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Clearly, ci(S) ≤ cj(S) for all i ∈ Nk, j ∈ Nl, with k ≥ l. We will show by
complete induction over k that the players in N1∪· · ·∪Nk will not participate in
any improving move of any coalition. We start with the case k = 1. Let (ue)e∈E
be the vector of capacities in the algorithm after the strategy packing oracle
returned ∅ for the first time and ue1 is updated. Suppose there is a coalition
C1 ⊆ N with C1 ∩ N1 6= ∅ that deviates profitably from strategy profile S to
strategy profile T = (S ′C1 , S−C1). We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: ne(T ) ≤ ue for all e ∈ E. Since O(E, (Si)i∈N ′ , (u˜e)e∈E) = ∅, where
u˜e = ue − 1, if e = e1 and ue, else, at least |N1| players use e1 in T . Using
de1(T ) ≥ de(S) for all e ∈ E, we obtain a contradiction to the fact that every
member of C1 must strictly improve.
Case 2: There is e˜ ∈ E such that ne˜(T ) > ue. Using that Dual Greedy
iteratively reduces the capacity of those resources with maximum delay, we derive
that de˜(ne˜(T )) ≥ de(ne(S)) for all e ∈ E. Using ne˜(T ) > ue, there is at least one
player i ∈ C1 with e˜ ∈ ti, hence, this player does not strictly improve.
For the induction step k → k + 1, suppose the players in N1 ∪ · · · ∪ Nk
stick to their strategies and consider the players in Nk+1. With a slight abuse
of notation we again denote by (ue)e∈E the vector of capacities in the algorithm
after the strategy packing oracle returned ∅ for the (k + 1)-st time and uek+1 is
updated. Recall that in the (k + 1)-st iteration of the algorithm the equality
N ′ = Nk+1 ∪ · · · ∪ NK holds. Now, suppose that there is a coalition Ck+1 with
Ck+1∩Nk+1 6= ∅ that deviates profitably from strategy profile S to strategy profile
T = (S ′Ck+1, S−Ck+1). Using the induction hypothesis we know that Ck+1∩Ni = ∅
for all i ≤ k. We again distinguish the following two cases.
Case 1: ne(T ) ≤ le + ue for all resources e ∈ E.
Note that O(E, (Si)i∈N ′ , (u˜e)e∈E) = ∅, where u˜e = ue− 1 if e = ek+1 and u˜e = ue,
else. Using that no player in N1∪· · ·∪Nk takes part in the deviation from S to T
and that T satisfies ne(T ) ≤ le + ur we derive that nek+1(T ) ≥ lek+1 + uek+1. This
implies by construction that dek+1(nek+1(T )) ≥ de(ne(S)) for all resources e ∈ N
and we obtain a contradiction to the fact that every member of the coalition Ck+1
strictly improves.
Case 2: There is a resource e˜ ∈ E such that ne˜(T ) > le + ue. Again
using the induction hypothesis and the fact that Dual Greedy iteratively re-
duces the capacity of the resources with maximum delay de(le + ue), we obtain
de˜(ne˜(T )) ≥ de(ne(S)) for all e ∈ E. Hence, there is at least one player of the
deviating coalition moving to resource e˜ and does not improve. Thus, a contra-
diction. 2
It is worth noting that the dual greedy algorithm applies to arbitrary strategy
spaces. If the strategy packing problem can be solved in polynomial time, this
algorithm computes a strong equilibrium in polynomial time. Hence, the problem
of computing a strong equilibrium is polynomial time reducible to the strategy
packing problem. For general bottleneck congestion games the converse is also
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true.
Theorem 4.11 The strategy packing problem is polynomial time reducible to the
problem of computing a strong equilibrium in a bottleneck congestion game.
Proof: Given an instance of the set packing problem Π we construct a bot-
tleneck congestion game ΓΠ. Let Π be given as set of resources R with upper
bounds (ur)r∈R, and n collections S1, . . . ,Sn ⊆ 2R. The game ΓΠ consists of the
resource R ∪ {e1, . . . , en} and the players 1, . . . , n + 1. The set of strategies of
player i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is {s ∪ {ei} | s ∈ Si}. Player n + 1 has the strategy R and
the strategy {e1, . . . , en}. For each resource r ∈ R The delay is 0 it is used by at
most ur + 1 and 2 otherwise. For each resource e ∈ {e1, . . . , en} the delay is 0, if
used by at most one player and 1, otherwise.
If a strategy profile of the player 1, . . . , n violates an upper bound ur on a
resource r ∈ R, player n + 1 has delay of 2 if he plays strategy R. If he plays
{e1, . . . , en} he and all other players have delay of 1. Hence, if there is a fea-
sible strategy packing, every strong equilibrium of the game yields delay 0 for
every player. Otherwise, every strong equilibrium yields delay 1 for every player.
Therefore, the strategy profile of the players 1, . . . , n in a strong equilibrium of ΓΠ
corresponds to a solution for the strategy packing problem Π, if such a solution
exists. On the other hand, if there is no solution for Π, every player in every
strong equilibrium in ΓΠ has delay of 1. 2
In the next section we will present some interesting cases, in which the strategy
packing problem can be solved in polynomial time, or in which computation
becomes NP-hard.
4.6.2 Complexity of Strategy Packing
Theorem 4.12 The strategy packing problem can be solved in polynomial time
for matroid bottleneck congestion games where the strategy set of player i equals
the set of bases of a matroid Mi = (R, Ii) given by a polynomial independence
oracle.
Proof: For each matroid Mi = (R, Ii), we construct a matroid M ′i = (R
′, I ′i)
as follows. For each resource r ∈ R, we introduce ur resources r1, . . . , rur to
R′. We say that r is the representative of r1, . . . , rur . Then, a set I ′ ⊂ R′ is
independent in M ′i if the set I that arises from I
′ by replacing resources by their
representatives is independent inMi. This construction gives rise to a polynomial
independence oracle for M ′i .
Now, we regard the matroid union M ′ = M ′1 ∨ · · · ∨ M
′
n, which again is a
matroid. Using the algorithm proposed by Cunningham [Cun86] we can compute
a maximum-size set B in I ′1 ∨ · · · ∨ I
′
n in time polynomial in n, m, rk(M), and
the maximum complexity of the n independence oracles.
4.6. BOTTLENECK CONGESTION GAMES 59
Clearly, if |B| <
∑
i∈N rk(Mi), there is no feasible packing of the bases of
M1, . . . ,Mn. If, in contrast, |B| =
∑
i∈N rk(Mi), we obtain the corresponding
strategies (S1, . . . , Sn) using the algorithm. 2
We now consider strategy spaces defined as a-arborescences, which are in general
not matroids. Let D = (V,R) be a directed graph with |R| = m. For a distin-
guished node in a ∈ V , we define an a-arborescence as a directed spanning tree,
where a has in-degree zero and every other vertex has in-degree one.
Theorem 4.13 The strategy packing problem can be solved in time O(m2 n2) for
a-arborescence games in which the set of strategies of each player equals the set
of a-arborescences in a directed graph D = (V,R).
For single-commodity networks efficient computation of a strong equilibrium
is possible using well-known flow algorithms to implement the oracle. When we
generalize to two commodities, however, a variety of problems concerning strong
equilibrium become NP-hard by a simple construction.
Theorem 4.14 The strategy packing problem can be solved in time O(m3) for
single-commodity bottleneck congestion games.
Proof: Assigning a capacity of ue to each edge and using the algorithm of
Edmonds and Karp we obtain a maximum flow within O(m3). Clearly, if the
value of the flow is smaller than n, no admissible strategies exist and we can
return ∅. If the flow is n or larger we can decompose it in at least n unit flows
and return n of them. 2
Theorem 4.15 In two-commodity network bottleneck games it is strongly NP-
hard to (1) compute a strong equilibrium, (2) decide for a given state whether
any coalition has an improving move, and (3) decide for a given state and a
given coalition if it has an improving move.
Proof: We reduce from the 2 Directed Arc-Disjoint Paths (2DADP)
problem, which is strongly NP-hard, see Fortune et al. [FHW80]. The problem
is to decide if for a given directed graph D = (V,A) and two node pairs (s1, t1),
(s2, t2) there exist two arc-disjoint (s1, t1)- and (s2, t2)-paths. For the reduction,
we define a corresponding two-commodity bottleneck game by introducing non-
decreasing delay functions on every arc e by de(x) = 0, if x ≤ 1 and 1, else. We
associate every commodity with a player. Then, 2DADP is a Yes-instance if and
only if every strong equilibrium provides a payoff of zero to every player. For the
other problems we simply construct a solution, in which the strategies are not
arc-disjoint. The remaining results follow. 2
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4.6.3 Convergence of Improvement Dynamics
While previous work [HKM09] establishes convergence to strong equilibrium for
every sequence of coalitional improving moves, it may already be hard to find one
such move. In fact, we show that an α-improving move can be strongly NP-hard
to find, even if strategy spaces have simple matroid structures. This implies that
deciding whether a given state is an α-approximate strong equilibrium is strongly
co-NP-hard – even if all delay functions satisfy the β-bounded-jump condition1
for any β > α.
Theorem 4.16 In matroid bottleneck congestion games it is strongly NP-hard to
decide for a given strategy profile S if there is some coalition C ⊆ N that has an
α-improving move, for every polynomial time computable α.
Proof: We reduce from Set Packing. An instance of Set Packing is
given by a set of elements R and a set U of sets U ⊆ R, and a number k. The
goal is to decide if there are k mutually disjoint sets in U . Given an instance of
Set Packing we show how to construct a matroid game Γ and a state S such
that there is an improving move for some coalition of players C if and only if the
instance of Set Packing has a solution.
The game will include |N | = 1 + |U| + |R| +
∑
U∈U |U | many players. First,
we introduce a master player p1, which has two possible strategies. He can either
pick a coordination resource ec or the trigger resource et. For each set U ∈ U ,
there is a set player pU . Player pU can choose either et or a set resource eU . For
each set U and each element r ∈ U , there is an inclusion player pU,r. Player pU,r
can use either the set resource eU or an element resource er. Finally, for each
element r, there is an element player pr that has strategies {ec, er} and {ec, ea}
for some absorbing resource ea.
The strategy profile S is given as follows. Player p1 is on ec, all set players
use et, all inclusion players the corresponding set resources eU , and all element
players the strategies {ec, er}. The coordination resource ec is a bottleneck for the
master player and all element players. The delays are dec(x) = α + 1, if x > |R|
and 1, otherwise. The trigger resource has delay det(x) = 1, if x ≤ |U| − k + 1,
and α + 1, otherwise. For the set resources eU the delay is deU (x) = 1, if x ≤ 1
and α+ 1, otherwise. Finally, for the element resources the delay is der(x) = 1 if
x ≤ 1 and α + 1 otherwise.
Suppose that the underlying Set Packing instance is a Yes-instance, then an
α-improving move is as follows. The master player moves to et, the k set players
corresponding to a solution choose their set resources, the respective inclusion
players move to the element resources, and all element players move to ea. The
delay of ec reduces from α + 1 to 1, and the delay of et reduces from α + 1
1Delay function de satisfies the β-bounded-jump condition if de(x + 1) ≤ β · de(x) for any
x ≥ 1.
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to 1. Thus, the master player, all set players, and all element players improve
their bottleneck by a factor of α + 1. The migrating inclusion players do not
interfere with each other on the element resources. Thus, they also improve the
delay of their bottleneck resource by factor α + 1, and we have constructed an
α-improving move for the coalition of all migrating players, all set players, and
all element players.
Suppose that the underlying Set Packing instance is a No-instance. For
contradiction, assume that there is a coalition C that has an α-improving move.
Consider any player p ∈ C. We will show that for any player p 6= p1, i.e., any
set, inclusion, or element player, p1 ∈ C is a prerequisite for achieving any strict
improvement. We first note that the master player can never strictly improve
without changing his strategy, because all element players will always use ec in
their strategy. A move from ec to et is an improvement if and only if at least k
set players drop et. These players must switch to the corresponding resources.
However, for a set player pM such a move is an improvement if and only if all
inclusion players on eU drop this resource from their strategy. These inclusion
players must switch to the element resources. An inclusion player pU,r improves
by such a move if and only if the element player drops the resource and pU,r is
the only inclusion player moving to er. This implies that the moving set players
must correspond to sets that are mutually disjoint. Finally, the element players
move from er to ea with delay dea = 0, and this is an improvement if and only if
the master player moves away from ec. This last argument establishes that p ∈ C
implies p1 ∈ C.
However, if the master player p1 ∈ C, then we again follow the chain of
reasoning above and see that the players corresponding to at least k mutually
disjoint sets must move and therefore be in C. This is a contradiction to having
a No-instance.
Finally, we can add the resource ea to every strategy of the master, set, and
inclusion players. In this way, the combinatorial structure of all strategy spaces
is the same – a partition matroid M with rk(M) = 2 and partitions of size 1 and
2 – only the mapping to resources is different for each player.
2
The previous theorem shows hardness of the problem of finding a suitable
coalition and a corresponding improving move. Even if we specify the coalition
in advance and search only for strategies corresponding to an improving move,
the problem remains strongly NP-hard.
Theorem 4.17 In matroid bottleneck congestion games it is strongly NP-hard to
decide for a given strategy profile S and a given coalition C ⊆ N if there is an
α-improving move for C, for every polynomial time computable α.
Proof: We will show this theorem using the games constructed in the pre-
vious proof by fixing the coalition C = N . Consider the construction in the
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previous proof. The coalition described above that has an improving move for a
Yes-instance consists of the master player, all set players, all element players and
the inclusion players that correspond to the sets of the solution to Set Packing.
However, the inclusion players are only needed to transfer the chain of depen-
dencies to the element players. We can set the strategy space of player pU,e to
{rh, rl} × {rU , re}. Here rh and rl are two resources with delays drh = α+ 1 and
drl = 0. In S we assign the inclusion players to strategies {rh, rU}. Then an
improving move for the inclusion players that remain on rU is to exchange rh by
rl. Thus, the problem of finding an arbitrary coalition with an improving move
becomes trivial. However, we strive to obtain an improving move for C = N ,
and this must generate improvements for the master player and the set players.
Thus, we still must reassign some inclusion players from the resources rU to the
element resources re. Here we need to resolve conflicts as before, because other-
wise inclusion players end up with a delay of α + 1 on re and do not improve.
Following the previous reasoning we have an α-improving move if and only if the
underlying Set Packing instance is solvable. Finally, by appropriately adding
dummy resources, we can again ensure that the combinatorial structure of all
strategy spaces is the same. 2
We can adjust the previous two hardness results on matroid games to hold
also for single-commodity network games.
Theorem 4.18 In single-commodity network bottleneck congestion games it is
strongly NP-hard to decide for a given state S (1) if there is some coalition C ⊆ N
that has an α-improving move, and (2) if a given coalition C ⊆ N has an α-
improving move, for every polynomial time computable α.
Proof: We transform the construction of Theorem 4.16 into a symmetric
network bottleneck congestion game, see Fig. 4.4 for an example. First, we in-
troduce for each resource ec, et, eU for all U ∈ U and er for all r ∈ R an edge
with the corresponding delay function as before. Additionally, we identify players
and their strategies by routing them through a set of gadgets composed of edges,
which have capacities implemented by cost functions that are 1 up to a capacity
bound and α + 10 above.
The first gadget is to separate the players into groups. An edge with capacity
1 identifies the master player, an edge with capacity |U| the set players, an edge
with capacity
∑
U∈U |U | the inclusion players, and an edge with capacity |R| the
element players. The set and inclusion players are then further divided into their
particular identities by edges of capacity 1. The element players route all over ec.
In addition, the master player has the alternative to route over ec or et. After the
players have passed ec they again split into specific element players using edges of
capacity 1. One player is allowed to route directly to the source t. This is meant
to be the master player, but it does not hurt our argument if this is not the case.
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Figure 4.4: Network construction for a Set Packing instance with U =
{{r1, r2}, {r2, r3}, {r3, r1}}. Gray nodes serve as identification for players as dis-
cussed in the text.
After the players have routed through the capacitated gadgets, they can be
assumed to reach an identification point (indicated by gray nodes in Fig. 4.4) and
obtain an identity. Then they decide on a strategy from the previous game by
routing over one of two allowed paths. In particular, we can allow the set players
to route either over et or their eU , the inclusion players over eU or er, and the
element players over er or directly to the sink t.
We can create the corresponding state S as before by assigning the master
player to route over ec directly to the sink, the set players over et, the inclusion
players over eU and the element players over er. This assignment is such that
every player receives one identity (i.e., routes over exactly one gray node) and
every identity is taken (i.e., every gray node is reached by exactly one player).
This property also holds for every improving move – with the exception of one
element player, who might route directly from ec to the sink, but as noted before
this does not hurt the argument.
Our network structure allows to reconstruct the reasoning as before. Any
improving move must include the master player, which improves if and only if
he moves together with players corresponding to a solution to the Set Packing
instance. Note that even by switching player identities, we cannot create an
improving move when the underlying Set Packing instance is unsolvable. This
proves the first part of the theorem.
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For the second part, we use the same adjustment as in Corollary 4.17 to en-
sure that inclusion players can always improve. Directly before the middle fan
out (see Figure 4.4) that results in identification of inclusion players we simply
insert a small gadget with 2 parallel edges el and eh. In this way, all inclusion
players must route over one of el or eh and one of their corresponding eU or er.
This resembles the strategy choices in the matroid game and yields hardness of
computing an improving move for the coalition C = N . This proves the theorem.
2
Despite the fact that (coalitional) improving moves are NP-hard to compute,
one might hope that the state graph becomes sufficiently dense such that it allows
short improvement paths. Unfortunately, we can show that this is not true, even
if we consider all improving moves of coalitions of size up to O(n1−ǫ), for any
constant ǫ > 0. A standard transformation [FPT04] immediately yields the same
result even for symmetric games when sacrificing the bounded-jump condition.
Theorem 4.19 For every α > 2, there is a β > 1 such that, for every n ∈ N
and for every k ∈ N, there is a bottleneck congestion game Γ(n, k) and a strat-
egy profile S with the following properties. The description length of Γ(n, k) is
polynomial in n and k. The length of every sequence of α-improving moves of
coalitions of size at most k leading from s′ to an α-approximate k-strong equilib-
rium is exponential in n. All delay functions of Γ(n, k) satisfy the β-bounded-jump
condition.
Proof: Our proof adjusts the construction of [SV08], which we recapitulated
in the appendix. The main idea of our adjustment is to construct a bottleneck
congestion game Γ(n, k) by generating k copies of the game G(n). We then add
resources to the strategies. These resources make sure that there is a improvement
step for a player inG(n) if and only if there is a improvement step of corresponding
k players of the k copies in Γ(n, k).
To each strategy j ∈ {1, . . . , 9} of player every Maini of every the copy
m ∈ {1, . . . , k} we add a resource Aji,k. Additionally, we add this resource to
all strategies j′ 6= j of all players Maini of every other copy m′ 6= m. Each
of these resources has delay of δi−1 if it is allocated by at most one player and
δi+3 otherwise. Analogously, we add resources to the strategies of the auxiliary
players. That is, for every player Blockji of every copy m ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we add
a resource Bji in his strategy 1. We also add his resource in every strategy 2 of
the every player Blockji of every other copies m
′ 6= m. Similarly, for every player
Blockji of every copy m ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we add a resource C
j
i in his strategy 2,
which we also add to every strategy 1 of the every player Blockji of every other
copies m′ 6= m. Each of these resources has a delay of δi−1 if it is allocated by at
most one player and δi+3 otherwise. Finally, we have to increase δ slightly.
We obtain the initial strategy profile S ′ of Γ(n, k) if every player of every
copy m of G(n) plays according to the initial strategy profile S of his copy. It it
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easy to see, that no coalition of less than k player of a copy m has an incentive
to change their strategies. At least one of them would have to allocate a A-,
B-, or C-resource that is already in use by another player. Thus, it is not an
improvement step for these players. We, therefore, can conclude that all k copies
of a player always choose the same strategy. On the other hand, if there is an
improving move of one player in G(n), there is a coalitional improving move of
all k copies of that player in Γ(n, k). If all players mimic this deviation in their
copies, by construction, no two players allocate the same A-, B-, or C-resource.
Furthermore, if the improvement step decreases the delay in G(n), it does so for
every copy of the player in Γ(n, k).
Finally, note that as long as k is polynomial in n we obtain a reduction of
polynomial size. In particular, for k = n1/ǫ−1 we obtain a new game with nk
players, for which the unilateral moves of G(n) are exactly moves of coalitions
of size (nk)1−ǫ and no smaller coalitions have improving moves. This proves the
theorem.
2
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Chapter 5
Altruism in Congestion Games
5.1 Introduction
The study of algorithmic issues in systems with interacting rational agents has fo-
cused on models for a variety of important applications in the Internet, e.g., selfish
routing [RT02,AAE05,CK05], network creation [ADK+08], as well as aspects of
e-commerce [GHK+05] and social networks [GM08]. A fundamental assumption
in these models, however, is that all agents are selfish. Their goals are restricted
to optimizing their direct personal benefit, e.g., their personal delay in a routing
game. The assumption of selfishness in the preferences of agents is found in the
vast majority of present work on economic aspects of large networks like the In-
ternet. However, this assumption has been repeatedly questioned by economists
and psychologists. In experiments it has been observed that participant behavior
can be quite complex and contradictive to selfishness [Led97, Lev98]. Various
explanations have been given for this phenomenon, e.g., senses of fairness [FS99],
reciprocity among agents [GBBF05], or spite and altruism [Lev98,ESS98].
Prominent developments in the Internet like Wikipedia, open source soft-
ware development, or Web 2.0 applications involve or explicitly rely on voluntary
participation and contributions towards a joint project without direct personal
benefit. These examples display forms of altruism, in which agents accept certain
personal burdens (e.g., by investing time, attention, and money) to improve a
common outcome. While malicious behavior has been considered recently for in-
stance in nonatomic routing [KV07,BKP09,CK08], virus inoculation [MSW06],
or bayesian congestion games [Gai08], a deeper analysis of the effects of altruistic
agents on competitive dynamics in algorithmic game theory is still missing.
We consider and analyze a model of altruism inspired by Ledyard [Led97, p.
154], and recently studied for non-atomic routing games by Chen and Kempe [CK08].
Each agent i is assumed to be partly selfish and partly altruistic. Her incentive
is to optimize a linear combination of personal cost and social cost, given by
the sum of cost values of all agents. The strength of altruism of each agent i is
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captured by her altruism level βi ∈ [0, 1], where βi = 0 results in a purely selfish
and βi = 1 in a purely altruistic agent.
Chen and Kempe [CK08] proved that in non-atomic routing games Nash equi-
libria are always guaranteed to exist, even for partially spiteful users, and ana-
lyzed the price of anarchy for parallel link networks. We conduct the first study
of altruistic agents in atomic congestion games.
As one might expect, the presence of altruists can significantly alter the con-
vergence and existence guarantees of pure Nash equilibria in congestion games.
After a formal definition of congestion games with altruists in Section 5.2, we
concentrate on pure equilibria and leave a study of mixed Nash equilibria for
future work. Our results are as follows.
It is a simple exercise to observe that even in a singleton game, in which
each strategy consists of a single resource, and for symmetric agents, where each
agent has the same set of strategies, a Nash equilibrium can be absent. This
is the case even for pure altruists and egoists, i.e., a population of agents which
are either purely altruistic or purely selfish and their βi ∈ {0, 1}. However, we
show in Section 5.3 that such games admit a polynomial time algorithm to decide
the existence problem. Furthermore, our algorithm can be adapted to compute
the Nash equilibrium with best and worst social cost if it exists, for any agent
population with a constant number of different altruism levels.
For slightly more general asymmetric singleton games, in which strategy
spaces of agents differ, we show in Section 5.3 that deciding the existence of
Nash equilibria becomes NP-hard. Nevertheless, for the important subclass of
convex delay functions, i.e., linear and superlinear functions, previous results im-
ply that for any agent population a Nash equilibrium exists and can be obtained
in polynomial time. In contrast, we show in Section 5.4.1 that convexity of delay
functions is not sufficient for more general games. In particular, even for sym-
metric network games, in which strategies represent paths through a network,
quadratic delay functions and pure altruists, Nash equilibria can be absent and
deciding their existence is NP-hard.
Perhaps surprisingly, if all delay functions are linear, then there is a potential
function. Thus, for every agent population Nash equilibria exist and better-
response dynamics converge. We present this result in Section 5.4.2 in the form of
a characterization for more general potential games. We outline a class of games
and social cost functions that guarantee the existence of a potential function
even upon introduction of altruists. As examples of such games we briefly study
local interaction games and selfish scheduling with a Time-Sharing coordination
mechanism. In Section 5.4.3 we extend to weighted congestion games and show
that even for parallel links, delays de(x) = x and pure altruists, Nash equilibria
can again be absent and deciding their existence is NP-hard. If, however, we
consider social cost as the weighted sum of cost values for all agents, then these
games again are part of our class, and existence and convergence are guaranteed.
In addition to these results for uncoordinated dynamics, in Section 5.5 we con-
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sider a slightly more coordinated scenario, in which there is a central institution
striving to obtain a good outcome. An obvious way to induce favorable behavior
is to convince agents to act altruistically. In this context a natural question is
how many altruists are required to stabilize a social optimum. This has been
considered under the name “price of optimum” in [KS09] for Stackelberg routing
in nonatomic congestion games. As a Nash equilibrium in atomic games is not
necessarily unique, we obtain two measures - an optimal stability threshold, which
is the minimum number of altruists such that there is any optimal Nash equilib-
rium, and an optimal anarchy threshold, which asks for the minimum number of
altruists such that every Nash equilibrium is optimal. For symmetric singleton
games, we adapt our algorithm for computing Nash equilibria to determine both
thresholds in polynomial time.
In our model the optimal anarchy threshold might not be well-defined even
for singleton games. If all agents are altruists, there are suboptimal local optima
in symmetric games with concave delays, or in asymmetric games with linear
delays. Hence, even by making all agents altruists, the worst Nash equilibrium
sometimes remains suboptimal. In contrast, we adapt the idea of the optimal
stability threshold to a very general scenario, in which we can find a stable state
with a given, not necessarily optimal, congestion profile. Each agent has a per-
sonalized stability cost for accepting a strategy under the given congestions. We
provide an incentive compatible mechanism to determine an allocation of agents
to strategies with minimum total stability cost. Unfortunately, such a general
result is restricted to the case of singleton games. Even for symmetric network
games on series-parallel graphs, we show that the problem of determining the
optimal stability threshold is NP-hard. Our reduction also yields inapproxima-
bility within any finite factor. This resolves an open problem raised in [KS08] on
computing the “price of optimum” in atomic congestion games.
5.2 Model and Initial Results
We consider congestion games with altruists. We recall that the delay for an
agent i playing si in state S is di(S) =
∑
e∈si de(ne). The social cost of a state
is the total delay of all agents c(S) =
∑
i∈N
∑
e∈si de(ne) =
∑
e∈E nede(ne). Each
agent i has an altruism level of βi ∈ [0, 1], and her individual cost is ci(S) =
βic(S) + (1 − βi)di(S). We call an agent i an egoist if βi = 0 and a βi-altruist
otherwise. A (pure) altruist has βi = 1, a (pure) egoist has βi = 0. A game Γ
with only pure altruists and egoists is a game, in which βi ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N .
A game Γ is said to have β-uniform altruists if βi = β ∈ [0, 1] for every agent
i ∈ N . A (pure) Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile S, in which no agent i can
unilaterally decrease her individual cost by unilaterally changing her strategy.
If all agents are egoists, the game is a regular congestion game, which has an
exact potential function Φ(S) =
∑
e∈E
∑ne
x=1 de(x) [Ros73]. Thus, existence of
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Nash equilibria and convergence of iterative better-response dynamics are guar-
anteed. Obviously, if all agents are altruists, Nash equilibria correspond to local
optima of the social cost function c with respect to a local neighborhood consist-
ing of single player strategy changes. Hence, existence and convergence are also
guaranteed. This directly implies the same properties for β-uniform games, in
which an exact potential function is Φβ(S) = (1− β)Φ(S) + βc(S).
In general, however, Nash equilibria might not exist.
Proposition 5.1 There are symmetric singleton congestion games with only pure
altruists and egoists without a Nash equilibrium.
Example 5.2 Consider a game with two resources e and f , three egoists and one
(pure) altruist. The delay functions are de(x) = df(x) with de(1) = 4, de(2) = 8,
de(3) = 9, and de(4) = 11. Then, in equilibrium each resource must be allocated
by at least one egoist. In case there are two agents on each resource, the social
cost is 32. In this case the altruist is motivated to change as the resulting cost
is 31. In that case, however, one of the egoists on the resource with congestion 3
has an incentive to change. Thus, no Nash equilibrium will evolve.
Our interest is thus to characterize the games that have Nash equilibria. To-
wards this end we observe that an altruistic congestion game can be cast as a
congestion game with player-specific latency functions [Mil96]. In such a game
the delay of resource e to player i depends on the congestion and on the player,
i.e., ci(S) =
∑
e∈si de(ne, i). To embed our games within this framework, we con-
sider a game with only pure altruists and egoists for simplicity. An altruist moves
from si to s
′
i if the decrease in total delay nede(ne) on the resources e ∈ si−s
′
i she
is leaving exceeds the increase on resources e ∈ s′i−si she is migrating to. Hence,
altruists can be seen as myopic selfish agents with ci(S) = d
′
i(S) =
∑
e∈si d
′
e(ne)
with d′e(ne) = nede(ne)− (ne − 1)de(ne − 1), for ne > 0. We set d
′
e(0) = 0. Nat-
urally, a βi-altruist corresponds to a selfish agent with player-specific function
ci(S) = (1−βi)di(S)+ βid
′
i(S). Thus, our games can be embedded into the class
of player-specific congestion games. For some classes of such games it is known
that Nash equilibria always exist. In particular, non-existence in Example 5.2 is
due to the fact that the individual delay function for the altruist is not monotone.
Monotonicity holds, in particular, if delay functions are convex. In this case, it
is known that for matroid games, in which the strategy space of each agent is a
matroid, existence of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed [ARV08].
Corollary 5.3 [Mil96,ARV08] For any matroid congestion game with altruists
and convex delay functions a Nash equilibrium exists and can be computed in
polynomial time.
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5.3 Singleton Congestion Games
In the previous section we have seen that there are symmetric singleton conges-
tion games with only pure altruists and egoists with and without Nash equilibria.
For this class of games we can decide the existence of Nash equilibria in polyno-
mial time. In addition, we can compute a Nash equilibrium with minimum and
maximum social cost if they exist.
Theorem 5.4 For symmetric singleton games with only pure altruists and ego-
ists there is a polynomial time algorithm to decide if a Nash equilibrium exists
and to compute the best and the worst Nash equilibrium.
Proof: We first tackle the existence problem and present an approach similar
to [IMN+05] based on dynamic programming. The main idea is to reduce the
Nash equilibrium property to a constant number of constraints on the conges-
tion values of the machines. These constraints concern the maximum delay of
any machine and the minimum delay that an additional altruist or egoist would
experience if he arrives on any machine. For each of the polynomially many com-
binations of these values, we make use of symmetry and implicitly enumerate all
allocations that can be a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, using the social cost
to guide the recursion, we are able to find the best and worst Nash equilibria.
Suppose we are given a game Γ with the set N0 of n0 egoists and the set N1 of
n1 = n−n0 altruists. For a state S consider the set of resources E0 =
⋃
i∈N0 si on
which at least one egoist is located. The maximum delay of any resource on which
an egoist is located is denoted dmax0 = maxe∈E0 de(ne) and minimum delay of any
resource if an additional agent is added dmin+0 = mine∈E de(ne + 1). Similarly,
consider the set of resources E1 =
⋃
i∈N1 si. The maximum altruistic delay of any
resource, on which an altruist is located, is denoted dmax1 = maxe∈E1 d
′
e(ne) and
the minimum altruistic delay of any resource dmin+1 = mine∈E d
′
e(ne+1). A state
is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
dmax0 ≤ d
min+
0 and d
max
1 ≤ d
min+
1 . (5.1)
This condition yields a separation property. Consider a Nash equilibrium, in
which nE′,0 egoists and nE′,1 altruists are located on a subset E
′ ⊂ E of resources.
The Nash equilibrium respects the inequalities above for certain values dmax0/1 and
dmin+0/1 . Note that it is possible to completely change the assignment of agents in
E ′. If the new assignment respects the inequalities for the same values, it can be
combined with the assignment on E −E ′ and again a Nash equilibrium evolves.
This property suggests the following approach to search for an equilibrium.
Suppose the values for dmax0/1 and d
min+
0/1 are given. Our algorithm adds resources
e one by one and tests the possible numbers of egoists and altruists that can be
assigned to e. Suppose we have processed the resources from a subset E ′ and have
found the numbers of altruists and egoists, for which there is an assignment to
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resources E ′ such that there is no violation of equations (5.1) for the given delay
values. In this case, we know the feasible numbers of altruists and egoists that
are left to be assigned to the remaining resources. Suppose we have marked these
combinations of remaining agents in a boolean matrix R of size (n0+1)×(n1+1).
Here rij = 1 if and only if there is a feasible assignment of n0−i egoists and n1−j
altruists to E ′. For the new resource e we now test all combinations (ne,0, ne,1)
of altruists and egoists that can be allocated to e such that the equations (5.1)
remain fulfilled. We then compile a new matrix R′ of the feasible combinations
of remaining agents for the remaining resources E − E ′ − {e}. In particular, for
each tuple (ne,0, ne,1) and each positive entry rij of R we check if i−ne,0 ≥ 0 and
j−ne,1 ≥ 0. If this holds, we set the entry of R′ with index (i−ne,0, j−ne,1) to 1.
If e is the last resource to be processed, we check if the resulting matrix R′ has a
positive entry r′0,0 = 1. In this case a Nash equilibrium exists for the given values
of dmax{0,1} and d
min+
{0,1} , otherwise it does not exist. Due to the separation property
mentioned above, this approach succeeds to implicitly test all allocations that
fulfill equations (5.1) for the given values. Finally, note that there are only at
most O(n20n
2
1m
4) possible values for which we must run the algorithm.
The separation property mentioned above also applies to the best or worst
Nash equilibrium. In particular, consider the best Nash equilibrium S that re-
spects (5.1) for some fixed values dmax{0,1} and d
min+
{0,1} . Consider any subset of re-
sources E ′ with a number nE′,0 and nE′,1 of egoists and altruists, respectively. S
is the cheapest Nash equilibrium that respects (5.1) for the given values if and
only if the assignment of S in E ′ is the cheapest assignment with nE′,0 egoists
and nE′,1 altruists that respects (5.1) for the values. Thus, we can adjust our
approach as follows. For a set E ′ of processed resources, instead of simply noting
in rij that there is a feasible assignment to E
′ that leaves i egoists and j altruists,
we can remember the social cost of the cheapest of such assignments. Thus, the
matrix R is then a matrix of positive entries, for which we use a prohibitively
large cost to identify infeasible combinations. When we compile a new matrix R′
after testing all feasible assignments to a new resource e, we can denote in each
entry the minimum cost that can be obtained for the respective combination. A
similar argument works for computing the worst Nash equilibrium. This decides
the existence question and finds the cost values of best and worst Nash equilib-
ria. By tracing back the steps of the algorithm we can also discover the strategy
choices of agents. 2
Note that the previous proof can be extended to a constant number k of differ-
ent altruism levels. In this more general scenario we choose the delay parameters
for each level of altruists. For each resource e we then test all possible combina-
tions of agents from the different levels that we can allocate to a resource e and
satisfy all bounds. The matrix R changes in dimension to (nβ1+1)×. . .×(nβk+1)
to account for all feasible combinations of remaining agents. Finally, we need to
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test all combinations of delay bounds. However, if k is constant, all these opera-
tions can be done in polynomial time.
Corollary 5.5 For symmetric singleton games with altruists and a constant num-
ber of different altruism levels, there is a polynomial time algorithm to decide if a
Nash equilibrium exists and to compute the best and the worst Nash equilibrium.
As a byproduct, our approach also allows us to compute a social optimum
state in polynomial time. We simply assume all agents to be pure altruists and
compute the best Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 5.6 For symmetric singleton congestion games a social optimum state
can be obtained in polynomial time.
In case of asymmetric games, however, deciding the existence of Nash equilibria
becomes significantly harder.
Theorem 5.7 It is NP-hard to decide if a singleton congestion game with only
pure altruists and egoists has a Nash equilibrium if Γ is asymmetric and has
concave delay functions.
Proof: We reduce from 3Sat. Given a formula ϕ, we construct a congestion
game Γϕ that has a Nash equilibrium if and only if ϕ is satisfiable. Let x1, . . . , xn
denote the variables and c1, . . . , cm the clauses of a formula ϕ. Without loss of
generality [Tov84], we assume each variable appears at most twice positively and
at most twice negatively.
For each variable xi there is a selfish agentXi that chooses one of the resources
e1xi, e
0
xi
, or e0. The resources e
1
xi
and e0xi have the delay function 9x and resource
e0 has the delay function 7x+3. For each clause cj , there is a selfish agent Cj who
can choose one of the following three resources. For every positive literal xi in cj
he may choose e0xi . For every negated literal x¯i in cj he may choose e
1
xi
. Note that
there is a stable configuration with no variable agent on e0 if and only if there is
a satisfiable assignment for ϕ. Additionally, there are three selfish agents u1, u2,
and u3 who can choose e1 or e2. Each of the resources e1 and e2 has delay 4 if
used by one agent, delay 8 if used by two agents and delay 9 otherwise. The only
pure altruist u0 chooses between e1, e2, and e0. Note that the altruist chooses e1,
e2 if one of the variable agents is on e0.
If ϕ is satisfiable by a bitvector (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n), a stable solution for Γϕ can be
obtained by placing each variable agent xi on e
x∗i
xi . Since (x
∗
1, . . . , x
∗
n) satisfies ϕ
there is one resource for each clause agent that is not used by a variable agent.
Thus, we can place each clause agent on this resource, which he then shares with
at most one other clause agent. Let the altruist u0 use e0 and u1 and u2 choose
e1 and u3 choose e2. It is easy to check that this is a Nash equilibrium.
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If ϕ is unsatisfiable, there is no stable solution. To prove this it suffices to
show that one of the variable agents prefers e0. In that case the altruist never
chooses e0 and the agent u0, . . . , u3 play the sub game of Example 5.2. For the
purpose of contradiction assume that ϕ is not satisfiable but there is a stable
solution in which no variable wants to choose e0. This implies that there is no
other agent, i.e. a clause agent, on a resource that is used by a variable agent.
However, if all clause agents are on a resource without a variable agent we can
derive a corresponding bit assignment which, by construction, satisfies ϕ.
Therefore, Γϕ has a stable solution if and only if ϕ is satisfiable. 2
5.4 General Games
5.4.1 Congestion Games with Convex Delays
For any singleton game Γ with altruists and convex delay functions a Nash equilib-
rium always exists. For more general network structures, we show that convexity
of delay functions is not sufficient. In particular, this holds even for games with
only pure altruists and egoists in the case in which almost all delay functions
are linear of the form de(x) = aex, except for two edges, which have quadratic
delay functions de(x) = aex
2. For simplicity, we use some edges with non-convex
constant delay be. We can replace these edges by sufficiently many parallel edges
with delay bex. This transformation is of polynomial size and yields an equivalent
game with only convex delays.
Theorem 5.8 It is NP-hard to decide if a symmetric network congestion game
with only pure altruists and egoists and quadratic delay functions has a Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: We first reduce from 3Sat to asymmetric congestion games. Again,
we assume each variable appears at most twice positively and at most twice
negatively. In a second step, we show that the resulting congestion games can be
turned into symmetric games while preserving all necessary properties.
Our reduction is similar to the construction that we used in the proof of
Theorem 5.7. The structure of the resulting network congestion game GΓ is
depicted in Figure 5.1.
Each agent Xi chooses one of three paths from his source node sxi to his target
node t′ and therefore uses exactly one of the edges e0xi , e
1
xi
, or e0. Each clause
agent Cj uses a path from scj to t
′ and uses one of the three edges as described
in the proof of Theorem 5.7. That is, for each positive literal xi in cj he may
choose a path that includes the edge e0xi . For every negated literal x¯i in cj he
may choose a path that contains the edge e1xi.
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scj e1xi
e0
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sxi′
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e8
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e4 e5
e3
s2
t0
e2
Figure 5.1: The structure of the network of GΓ (solid edges only) and G
′
Γ.
There is a selfish agent u1 that chooses a path from s1 to t
′ and two selfish
agents u2 and u3 that allocate the path from s2 to t
′. Finally, one altruistic agent
u0 chooses a path from s0 to t0. As in the proof of Theorem 5.7, we can conclude
that there is a variable agent whose best response includes edge e0 if and only
if Γ is not satisfiable. If no variable agent is on e0, a Nash equilibrium can be
obtained by placing u1 on the path that begins with (e1, e0). For agent u0 it is
optimal to choose the path (e8, e6, e3).
However, if at least one variable agent is on the edge e0, there is no Nash
equilibrium. If the altruist u0 is on the path (e8, e6, e3), the best response for u1
is the path (e4, e5, e6, e7). If u1 is the path (e4, e5, e6, e7), the best response for the
altruist u0 is path (e7, e4, e2). If u0 is on (e7, e4, e2), the best response for u1 is
the path that begins with the edge e10. This, finally, is a state in which the best
response for u0 is (e8, e6, e3). Thus, the constructed network congestion game GΓ
has a Nash equilibrium if and only if the formula Γ is satisfiable.
Now, we turn the asymmetric network congestion game GΓ into a symmetric
congestion game G′Γ. We add a new source node s, a new target node t and a
node s′ to the network and connect them to GΓ as depicted by the dashed edges
in Figure 5.1. Note that M is an integer that is larger than the sum of possible
delay values in GΓ. If all agents play their best responses, then we can observe
the following: Each outgoing edge of s′ is used by exactly one selfish agent and
the altruist chooses a path that begins with the edge (s, s0). Every best response
path of a selfish agent finishes with the edge (t′, t). Every best response path of
the altruist ends with the edge (t0, t). Therefore, G
′
Γ has a Nash equilibrium if
and only if GΓ has a Nash equilibrium. 2
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Edge delay function
e0 7x+ 3
e1 2
e2 17
e3, e5, e7, e8, e9 0
e4 2.4x
2
e6 x
2
e10 18.5
e1xi,e
1
xi
9x
(s, sxi) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n Mx
(s, scj) ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m Mx
(s, s1), (s, s2), (s, s
′) Mx
(s, s0) (n+m+ 5)M
(t0, t) (n+m+ 5)M
(t′, t) Mx
Figure 5.2: The delay functions on the edges of GΓ and G
′
Γ. Edges that are not
listed here have delay of 0.
5.4.2 A General Condition for Existence and Convergence
Perhaps surprisingly, if every delay function is linear de(x) = aex + be, then
an elegant combination of the Rosenthal potential and the social cost function
yields a potential for arbitrary βi-altruists. Hence, existence of Nash equilibria
and convergence of sequential better-response dynamics is always guaranteed.
The proof carefully exploits the structure of altruistic behavior, as for congestion
games with general player-specific linear latency functions a potential does not
exist [GMT06].
We prove this result in a more general way for games with weighted potential
function. Our construction applies to a general class of these games, in which
potential and social cost function have a correlated structure. In particular, we
consider potential games with n agents. For simplicity we stick to our notation
with Si for the strategy space of agent i and S = (s1, . . . , sn) as state of the game.
In addition, we assume that there is a personal cost ci(S) for agent i, a potential
function Φ(S), and an arbitrary social cost function c(S). When we consider
such games with altruists, an altruistic agent with βi ∈ [0, 1] again optimizes the
trade-off (1 − βi)ci(S) + βic(S). While in our examples below we continue to
choose c(S) =
∑
i ci(S), we want to highlight that such a choice is not necessary
for our general argument.
We consider the introduction of altruists into potential games with a weighted
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potential function Φ. In a game with a weighted potential function there is a value
yi > 0 for each agent i such that
yi · (ci(S)− ci(s
′
i, S−i)) = Φ(S)− Φ(s
′
i, S−i) ,
for every state S and every strategy s′i ∈ Si. In this section we consider games
with weighted potential functions of the form
Φ(S) = a · c(S) +
n∑
i=1
hi(si) , (5.2)
where a > 0 is a constant and hi is an arbitrary function that does not depend on
any strategy choice Sj by any agent j 6= i. While we can always assume a = 1 by
division of the functions hi and the values yi, we will allow general values of a for
simplicity. The next theorem shows that when we introduce altruists into such
games, existence of Nash equilibria and convergence of sequential better-response
dynamics is always guaranteed.
Theorem 5.9 For every game with weighted potential function, in which social
cost and potential function satisfy Equation (5.2), any corresponding game with
altruists has a Nash equilibrium and sequential better-response dynamics con-
verges.
Proof: We show that we can transform the potential Φ for the original game
into a potential Ψ for the game with altruists. In particular, the following function
Ψ is sufficient
Ψ(S) = c(S) +
n∑
i=1
yi · (1− βi)
βi + a · yi · (1− βi)
· hi(si) .
Consider a state S and an improving strategy change of an agent i from si to
s′i resulting in a strategy profile S
′. We show that Ψ strictly decreases. For the
sake of clarity and brevity we set ∆Φ = Φ(S) − Φ(S ′), ∆C = c(S) − c(S ′), and
∆h = hi(si)−hi(s′i). Note that an improving strategy change for agent i requires
(1− βi)(ci(S)− ci(S
′)) + βi(c(S)− c(S ′))
= yi(1− βi)∆Φ + βi∆C
> 0 .
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This yields
Ψ(S)−Ψ(S ′) =
(
∆C +
yi · (1− βi)
βi + a · yi · (1− βi)
·∆h
)
=
1
βi + a · yi · (1− βi)
· ((β + a · yi · (1− βi))∆C + yi(1− βi)∆h)
=
1
βi + a · yi · (1− βi)
· (a · yi(1− βi)∆C + yi(1− βi)∆h + βi∆C)
=
1
βi + a · yi · (1− βi)
· (yi(1− βi)∆Φ + βi∆C)
> 0 ,
which proves the theorem. 2
We proceed to discuss a number of examples of games from different domains
with potential functions given by (5.2).
Congestion Games with Linear Delays
First, let us consider the case of congestion games with altruists and linear delay
functions. We only consider delays de(x) = aex without offset be, but as noted
earlier this is not a restriction. Note that in this case c(S) =
∑
e∈E aen
2
e, whereas
the Rosenthal potential reads Φ(S) = 1
2
∑
e∈E ae(ne(ne+1)). We can set a = 1/2
as well as yi = 1 and hi(si) =
∑
e∈si ae/2 for all agents i. With Theorem 5.9 we
obtain a potential function
Ψ(S) = c(S) +
n∑
i=1
1− βi
1 + βi
∑
e∈si
ae .
This yields the following corollary.
Corollary 5.10 For any congestion game with altruists and linear delay func-
tions there is always a Nash equilibrium and sequential better-response dynamics
converges.
Unfortunately, it follows directly from previous work [FPT04] that the number
of iterations to reach a Nash equilibrium can be exponential in the size of the
instance, and the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium is PLS-hard. For
regular congestion games with matriod strategy spaces [ARV08] Nash dynamics
converge in polynomial time. It is an interesting open problem if a similar result
holds for games with altruists.
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1 2
1 a,a d,c
2 c,d b,b
Φ 1 2
1 a-c 0
2 0 b-d
Figure 5.3: Payoffs and potential functions for symmetric 2× 2 games.
Local Interaction Games
Another class of games to which the argument can be applied are local interaction
games. In a local interaction game [Mor00] each player is a node in a graph.
He plays a separate symmetric 2 × 2 coordination game with every neighbor.
However, he can pick his strategy only once and has to apply it in every game he is
involved in. Local interaction games are central in the study of cascading behavior
and the diffusion of trends in networks (see, e.g., [Kle07] for an exposition).
Network interaction games [HS09c] generalize the construction to games with a
possibly different arbitrary symmetric 2 × 2 game on each edge. A symmetric
2 × 2 game is a 2-player game with S1 = S2 = {1, 2} and arbitrary payoffs
given as in Figure 5.3. Note that these games have an exact potential function,
which is displayed in Figure 5.3. For the social cost function we again assume
c(S) = c1(S) + cs(S). In this case, we again have a = 1/2, y1 = y2 = 1. With
h(1) = −c/2, h(2) = −d/2, and h1 = h2 = h we can verify that
Ψ(S) = c(S) +
∑
i=1,2
2(1− βi)
1 + βi
· hi(si)
is a weighted potential function for a 2 × 2 game with altruists. This construc-
tion directly extends to network interaction games, where the payoff of a player
is summed over different bilateral games played with different players. Thus,
Theorem 5.9 yields the following corollary.
Corollary 5.11 For network interaction games with altruists there is always a
Nash equilibrium and every sequential better-response dynamics converges.
We can formulate local optimization of weighted MaxCut as a special case in
these games. Thus, the number of iterations to reach a Nash equilibrium can be
exponential, and the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium is PLS-complete.
The potential function of this game is strikingly similar to the one for conges-
tion games with linear delay functions. This is no coincidence, as local interaction
games can be reformulated as congestion games with linear delays. It obviously
suffices to model the bilateral 2× 2 games separately. For such a game we intro-
duce four classes of resources with delays de1(x) = (a− d)x, de2,i(x) = (2d− a)x,
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de3(x) = (b − c)x, and de4,i(x) = (2c − b)x, for i = 1, 2. Strategy 1 for agent i
contains resources e1 and e2,i, strategy 2 contains e3 and e4,i. It is straightforward
to verify that in every state this yields exactly the same payoffs for all players as
the original game.
Selfish Scheduling
Our third example comes from the domain of selfish scheduling with coordination
mechanisms [CKN09]. In this game each agent is a task and chooses one out of m
machines as strategy. Thus, the strategy space of each agent is Si = {1, . . . , m}
for each i = 1, . . . , n. When agent i picks machine si, the processing time of his
task on si is pi,si > 0. There is a local scheduling policy that all machines use to
process the tasks that choose to be on the machine. The personal cost ci(S) of
agent i in a state S is the completion time on the chosen machine si given the
allocation decisions of all agents.
A simple example for a local policy is the Shortest-First policy, in which each
machine processes the tasks assigned to it without preemption in order of in-
creasing processing time (using a consistent tie-breaking, e.g., based on agent
ID). Given the ordering the first task is processed completely, afterwards the
second task is started and processed completely, and so on. Recently, a Time-
Sharing policy has been proposed in [DT09], in which each machine processes all
tasks assigned to it in parallel using processor sharing. Each task that allocates
the machine is initially given an equal share of processing time. When a task
finishes, then the machine is divided equally among the remaining tasks. Con-
sider for example 3 tasks with processing times 1, 2 and 3 that choose the same
machine. With Shortest-First task 1 finishes at time 1, task 2 at time 3 and task
3 at time 6. With Time-Sharing task 1 finishes at time 3, task 2 at time 7, task
3 at time 8. As the social cost of S under the Shortest-First policy (denoted
cSF (S)) and Time-Sharing policy (denoted cTS(S)) we again consider the sum of
all player costs.
Both selfish scheduling games with Shortest-First and with Time-Sharing
policies are potential games. While for Shortest-First this is established using
a lexicographic potential function [ILMS09], games with Time-Sharing allow an
exact potential function [DT09]. A straightforward observation based on cost
differences upon migration of a single agent shows that social cost and potential
functions satisfy Equation (5.2). In particular, there is a potential function Φ for
selfish scheduling with Time-Sharing policy such that
Φ(S) = cSF (S) =
1
2
(
cTS(S) +
n∑
i=1
pi,si
)
.
With Theorem 5.9 this yields a potential function Ψ for the game with altruists
given by
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Ψ(S) = cTS(S) +
n∑
i=1
1− βi
1 + βi
· pi,si .
Corollary 5.12 For selfish scheduling with Time-Sharing policy and altruists
there is always a Nash equilibrium and every sequential better-response dynamics
converges.
The similarity of the potential function to the cases before is apparent, and
again the game can be transformed into a congestion game with linear delay
functions as follows. We first add an agent- and strategy-specific resource ei,si
to every strategy si of agent i with delay dei,si (x) = 2pi,six. This accounts for
the additional offset in the potential function and the time in cTSi (S), which is
spent on processing the task of agent i. The remaining delay of cTSi (S) can be
accounted towards other agents. In particular, when pij ≥ pi′j , then agent i is
delayed pi′j units due to simultaneous processing of agent i
′. Similarly, agent i′ is
delayed only pi′j time units due to the presence of i. This allows to construct a
local interaction game, in which agents minimize costs, and each pair of agents i
and i′ plays a symmetric m×m game. The costs for state (j, j) in this game are
min{pij, pi′j} for both agents and j = 1, . . . , m. The cost for every other state
is 0 for both agents. Note that all these local interaction games can easily be
turned into congestion games with linear delays. Finally, combining this with the
resources ei,si completes the construction.
In contrast to general congestion games with linear delays, we show that
computing a Nash equilibrium can be done in polynomial time. This result is
established with a centralized algorithm that computes a state minimizing the
potential. It is an open problem to characterize the duration of better-response
dynamics in this class of games.
Theorem 5.13 For selfish scheduling with Time-Sharing policy and altruists a
Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof: We use the fact that the potential function is close to the social cost
function for the Shortest-First policy. Finding a socially optimal schedule for the
this policy can be done with bipartite matching [BJS74] by setting up a com-
plete bipartite network. In this network, one partition is the set of tasks, and
the other partition consists of nm nodes (j, k) for positions k = 1, . . . , n and
machines j = 1, . . . , m. The kth-to-last position on machine j induces a cost
of k · pij for task i. This cost is attached to the corresponding edge {i, (j, k)}.
Changing the order of summation yields that a minimum cost perfect matching
is an optimal assignment. We can set up this bipartite network and subtract
(2βipij)/(1 + βi) from each edge weight between task i and any position on ma-
chine j. The resulting minimization problem can again be solved by matching.
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Due to the structure, the optimal solution respects the shortest-first ordering on
each machine. Thus, we can efficiently compute a global minimum of Ψ, which
must be a Nash equilibrium. 2
For selfish scheduling with Shortest-First policy and altruists it is possible to
show that there is no potential function, even for small games with four players
and two identical machines, i.e., pi,1 = pi,2 = pi for all agents i [HS09b].
5.4.3 Weighted Congestion Games with Linear Delays
Sum-of-Weighted-Delays Social Cost
In this section we examine the extension to the case of weighted congestion games
with linear delay functions. In particular, we consider the simple case of symmet-
ric singleton weighted potential games with delay functions de(x) = aex. These
games have received a lot of attention under the name KP-model [KP99], and
they were studied as Makespan policy for selfish scheduling [ILMS09]. They have
a weighted potential function [EdKM03] given by
Φ(S) =
∑
e∈E
aen
2
e + aene =
n∑
i=1
wi · ci(S) +
n∑
i=1
asiwi .
For agent i we have ci(S)− ci(s′i, S−i) =
1
2wi
(Φ(S)−Φ(s′i, S−i)). We first consider
the social cost function cw(S) =
∑n
i=1wici(S), which is known in the scheduling
literature as sum of weighted completion times. We can use Theorem 5.9 to
obtain a potential function Ψ for the game with altruists given by
Ψ(S) = cw(S) +
n∑
i=1
1− βi
1 + βi(2wi − 1)
· asiwi .
Corollary 5.14 For symmetric singleton weighted congestion games with linear
latencies and social cost cw(S) there is always a Nash equilibrium and every se-
quential better-response dynamics converges.
It has been shown in [FGL+03] that for a population of only egoists better-
response dynamics can take O(2
√
n) steps to converge to a Nash equilibrium.
However, for identical latency functions there is a scheduling of moves to reach a
Nash equilibrium with best-response dynamics in polynomial time. In addition,
there are polynomial time algorithms to compute Nash equilibria for asymmetric
singleton games with linear delay functions [FGL+03,GLMM04].
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Sum-of-Delays Social Cost
As a second social cost function let us again consider c(S) =
∑
i ci(S), which has
been done previously for this model in [HS07,HS08,BGGM06]. This cost function
is known in the scheduling literature as sum of completion times. Although in
this case the relation between potential and social cost function is only slightly
different from the condition in Equation (5.2), our results are mostly negative.
We observe that even for identical delays and only one altruist, existence of a
Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed.
Proposition 5.15 There are games with two identical edges and one altruist
that have no Nash equilibrium.
Example 5.16 Consider a game with two edges, one pure altruist with w1 = 5,
and four egoists with w2 = 10, w3 = w4 = w5 = 1. Assume there is a Nash
equilibrium, then agent 2 chooses a different edge than agent 1. The agents 3,
4, and 5 choose a different edge than agent 2. However, agent 1 would choose
the machine with only agent 2, which leads to a contradiction. The idea can be
adjusted to an arbitrary altruist with β1 > 0 by adding sufficiently many agents
with small weight. In particular, instead of 3 we add strictly more than 1 + 1.4
β1
many egoists, which all have equally small weight, and for which their total weight
adds up to 3. For this game it can be shown that all arguments given above are
preserved.
In addition, we can show that it is NP-hard to decide if a Nash equilibrium
exists. The reduction is from Partition.
Theorem 5.17 It is NP-hard to decide if a weighted congestion game on three
identical parallel links with linear delays and one pure altruist has a Nash equi-
librium.
Proof: We reduce from the problem Partition. An instance I is given
as (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Nn and I ∈ Partition if and only if ∃I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} with∑
i∈I ai =
∑
j∈{1,...,n}\I aj . We first reduce a given instance I = (a1, . . . , an) to an
instance I ′ = (a1, . . . , an, an+1, . . . , an+8) with an+1 = . . . = an+8 =
∑
i∈{1,...,n} ai.
Clearly I ∈ Partition if and only if I ′ ∈ Partition.
In a second step we construct a game ΓI′ that has a Nash equilibrium if
and only if I ′ ∈ Partition. The game consists of three edges and n + 8 + 2
agents. The weight wi of agent 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 8 is ai. Agent n + 9 has weight
pn+9 =
∑
1≤j≤n+8 aj and agent n + 10 has weight pn+10 =
1
2
∑
1≤j≤n+8 aj . All
agents are pure egoists except for task n+ 10 who is a pure altruist.
If I ∈Partition, there is an I ⊂ {1, . . . , n+8} with
∑
i∈I ai =
1
2
∑
1≤j≤n+8 aj.
Assigning all agents i ∈ I to edge one, all agents j ∈ {1, . . . , n+8}\I to edge two,
and the remaining agents n + 9 and n + 10 to edge three is a Nash equilibrium.
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Note that the first two edges have a total weight of 1
2
∑
1≤j≤n+8 aj and edge three
has a weight of 3
2
∑
1≤j≤n+8 aj . Obviously, no agent from the first two edges has
an incentive to change to edge three. Neither has agent n + 9 an incentive to
change to one of the first two edges because his delay would not change. The
altruistic agent cannot improve the social cost by changing to one of the first two
edges. Note that at least 4 agents (half of the agents n, . . . , n + 8) are assigned
to each of the first two edges. Therefore, when the altruistic agents migrates the
social cost increases by at least 4wn+10 − (wn+10 + wn+9) > 0.
If I /∈Partition, assume for the sake of contradiction that there is a Nash
equilibrium. Observe that agent n+9 does not choose the edge that agent n+10
is on. Since there is no I ⊂ {1, . . . , n+8} with
∑
i∈I ai =
1
2
∑
1≤j≤n+8 aj , there ex-
ists an edge that has congestion of less than 1
2
∑
1≤j≤n+8 aj (while ignoring agent
n+ 9). On the other hand, each of the agents 1, . . . , n+ 8 can always choose an
edge that has congestion less than pn+9. Therefore, in equilibrium they choose
the other two edges. Note, that each of these two edges has at least 4 of the
agents n, . . . , n + 8. Finally, the altruistic agent n + 10 chooses the edge that
only agent n+ 9 is assigned to (changing to one of the other two edges increases
the social cost by at least 4wn+10 − (wn+10 + wn+9) > 0). This contradicts the
existence of a Nash equilibrium. 2
Our proof requires the presence of agents with different altruism levels. It is
an interesting open problem if the existence of a potential function can be shown
for games with β-uniform altruists.
5.5 Stabilization Methods
This section treats a scenario in which a central institution can convince selfish
agents to adopt socially favorable behavior and act altruistically. For simplicity
of presentation we first restrict to games with only pure altruists and egoists.
This is closely related to Stackelberg routing [KLO97, Rou04, Fot07] in atomic
congestion games, in which an altruistic leader can control the strategy choice of
a fixed portion of agents and strives to minimize the overall cost of the resulting
Nash equilibrium.
A natural question in our scenario is to consider is how many altruists are
required to guarantee that there is a Nash equilibrium with a certain cost, e.g. a
Nash equilibrium as cheap as a social optimum state. This problem has been
considered in non-atomic congestion games in [KS09,SW09]. We term this num-
ber the optimal stability threshold. In a more pessimistic direction it is of interest
to determine the minimum number of altruists needed to guarantee that the
worst-case Nash equilibrium is optimal. We term this number the optimal an-
archy threshold. Let us denote by n+1 and n
−
1 the optimal stability and anarchy
threshold, respectively. As a consequence from Theorem 5.4 we can compute
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both numbers for symmetric singleton congestion games in polynomial time. For
each number of altruists we check if the best and/or worst Nash equilibrium is
as cheap as the social optimum.
Corollary 5.18 For symmetric singleton congestion games with only pure altru-
ists and egoists there is a polynomial time algorithm to compute n+1 and n
−
1 .
Note that the optimal anarchy threshold is not well-defined, because the worst
Nash equilibrium might always be suboptimal, even for a population of altruists
only. In case of symmetric singleton games and convex delay functions, an easy
exchange argument serves to show that in this case any local optimum is also a
global optimum. However, for concave delay functions or asymmetric singleton
games, a local optimum might still be globally suboptimal.
Example 5.19 Consider a symmetric cogenstion game with two resources, d1(1) =
16, d1(2) = 32, d1(3) = 36, and d2(x) = 45. If all agents allocate resource 1, we
get a Nash equilibrium of cost 108. In the optimum two agents allocate resource
2 resulting in a cost of 106. Now consider an asymmetric game with three re-
sources and delay functions d1(x) = d2(x) = 8x, and d3(x) = 4x. Agent 1 can use
resources 1 and 2, agents 2 and 3 can use resources 2 and 3. The state (2, 3, 3)
is a Nash equilibrium of cost 32, while the social optimum is a state (1, 2, 3) of
cost 20.
Note that for symmetric games, our algorithm is able to detect the cases
in which suboptimal local optima exist. In the asymmetric case, however, a
similar approach fails, because of the NP-hardness of determining existence of a
Nash equilibrium. Thus, in the following we concentrate on the optimal stability
threshold.
In asymmetric games, it is also required to determine the identity of agents,
so here we strive to find a set (denoted N+e ) of minimum cardinality. For an
optimal set of congestion values n∗E = (n
∗
e)e∈E we can determine N
+
1 (n
∗
E) such
that there is a Nash equilibrium of the game with congestion values n∗e for all
e ∈ E.
Theorem 5.20 For singleton games with only pure altruists and egoists and a
social optimal congestion vector n∗E there is a polynomial time algorithm to com-
pute N+1 (n
∗
E).
Proof: Suppose we are given a congestion vector (n∗e)e∈E that results in min-
imum social cost. We now construct a weighted bipartite graph as follows. One
partition is the set of agents N . In the other partition we introduce for each
resource e a number of n∗e vertices. If e ∈ Si we connect agent i to all vertices
that were introduced due to e. Suppose e represents a best-response for i with
respect to egoistic delay d. Then we assign a weight of 0 to all corresponding
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edges between i and the vertices of e. To all other edges we assign a weight of 1.
Note that any feasible allocation of agents to strategies that generates the con-
gestion vector n∗e is represented by a perfect matching. Due to social optimality
an altruist can be matched with any strategy, while an egoist must be matched
to a selfish best response. If we match an agent to a strategy, which is not an
egoistic best-response, it has to become an altruist and a weight of one is counted
towards the weight of the matching. By computing a minimum weight perfect
matching [CR99], we can identify a minimal set N+1 (n
∗
E) of altruists required to
stabilize n∗E . 2
Observe that by creating the edges of cost 1 only to strategies which represent
best-responses with respect to the altruistic delay d′, we can compute N+1 (nE)
for arbitrary congestion vectors nE . In this case, the set might be empty, if
e.g. the congestion vector corresponds to a very expensive state and can never
be generated by a Nash equilibrium for any distribution of altruists. This case,
however, can be recognized by the absence of a perfect matching in the bipartite
graph.
This approach turns out to be applicable to an even more general natural
scenario. Suppose each agent i has a stability cost cie for each strategy e ∈ Si.
This cost yields the disutility for being forced to play a certain strategy given a
congestion vector nE. In this scenario we slightly change N
∗
1 (nE) to the set agents
of minimal stability cost. Still, we can compute this set by a minimum weight
perfect matching if we set the weights to cie for all edges connecting i to vertices
of e. The stability cost allows for general preferences exceeding categories like
altruists and egoists.
Corollary 5.21 For singleton games and a congestion vector nE there is a poly-
nomial time algorithm to compute N+1 (nE) with minimal stability cost.
The underlying problem can be seen as a slot allocation to agents. As the
computed allocation has minimal stability cost, it is possible to turn the algorithm
into a truthful mechanism using VCG payments (see e.g. [NRTV07, chapter 9]).
Our final mechanism (1) learns the stability costs from each agent, (2) determines
the allocation, and (3) pays appropriate amounts to agents for truthful revelation
of cost values and adaptation of allocated strategies. In addition, it can be verified
that all computations needed require only polynomial time.
Corollary 5.22 For singleton games and a congestion vector nE there is a truth-
ful VCG-mechanism to compute N+1 (nE) in polynomial time.
These general results are restricted to the case of singleton games. For more
general games we show that it is NP-hard to decide if there is a Nash equilibrium
as cheap as the social optimum. Our next theorem establishes this even for
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symmetric network congestion games with linear delays, in which an arbitrary
Nash equilibrium and a social optimum state can be computed in polynomial
time [FPT04]. Furthermore, the result requires only a series-parallel network.
Thus, even in this restricted case it is NP-hard to decide if the number n+1 of
pure altruists required is 0 or 1, or equivalently if N+1 (n
∗
E) is empty or not. This
directly yields hardness of approximation within any finite factor.
Theorem 5.23 For symmetric network congestion games with 3 agents, linear
delay functions on series-parallel graphs and optimal congestions n∗E it is NP-hard
to decide if there is a Nash equilibrium with congestions n∗E.
Proof: We reduce from Partition. Let an instance be given by positive in-
tegers a1, . . . , ak and a =
∑k
i=1 ai, where a is an even number. Create a network
with two nodes and two parallel edges e1 and e2 for each integer ai. The delay
de1(x) = 2aix, and de2(x) = aix. All these networks are concatenated sequen-
tially. We denote the first node of this path gadget by u and the last by v. In
addition, we add one edge f = (u, v) with delay df(x) =
3
4
ax. Finally, the game
has three egoists, which need to allocate a path from u to v.
The unique social optimum is to let one agent use f and the other two agents
use two edge-disjoint paths through the path gadget. This yields an optimal
social cost of 15
4
a. However, for a Nash equilibrium each path through the gadget
must not have more delay than 3
2
a. If the instance of Partition is solvable, then
the elements assigned to a partition represent the edges of type e1 that an agent
allocates in Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, if the instance is not solvable, there is
no possibility to partition the path gadget into two edge-disjoint paths of latency
at most 3
2
a.
The reduction works for a small constant number of agents but only shows
weak NP-hardness. If the number of agents is variable, it is possible to show
strong NP-hardness with a similar reduction from 3-Partition. 2
We remark that the previous theorem contrasts the continuous non-atomic
case, in which a minimal fraction of altruistic demand stabilizing an optimum
solution can be computed in any symmetric network congestion game [KS09].
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Open Problems
Similar to the devastating intractability results [DGP09,CD05,DP05,CDT09] for
mixed Nash equilibria, we observe that we have similar unsatisfactory results
for the solution concepts that we considered is this thesis. All these equilibrium
concepts can be ruled out as a candidate for a natural, convincing, universal,
tractable solution concept one may dream of. However, while we have not found
such a solution concept – if it exists – we resort to identify those cases in which our
existing concepts can be applied. Since this is not only of theoretical and technical
interest but also of practical importance, we identified several (sub-)classes of
games for which we can provide polynomial time algorithms that compute an
equilibrium.
We considered the concept of pure Nash equilibria and provided polynomial
time algorithms for general and player-specific congestion games with a constant
number of resources. It is an interesting open problem whether the problem is
fixed parameter tractable or not. To complement this result, we have shown that
the computational hardness of pure Nash equilibria in congestion games with
a non-constant number of resources is essentially independent of the number of
players as long as the number of strategy profiles is exponential. For bottle-
neck congestion games, we have shown that results from [ARV08] and [SV08]
essentially translate. It remains an interesting open question whether the posi-
tive result of [CS07] about quick convergence to approximate Nash equilibria for
symmetric games with bounded-jump delays can also be obtained for bottleneck
games.
We investigated the complexity of two problems related to sink equilibria.
The problems are In A Sink and Has A Non-singleton Sink. We showed
that both problems are PSPACE-hard for all three classes of games that we con-
sidered. These are weighted congestion games, player-specific congestion games,
and anonymous games. The result for the latter is particularly interesting since
– in contrast to the former two classes of games – pure Nash equilibria can be
computed efficiently.
We provided a detailed study of the computational complexity of strong equi-
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libria in Chapter. In anonymous games with a constant number of strategies, we
can decide the recognition problem efficiently. Deciding the existence of a strong
equilibrium for a given anonymous game, however, is strongly NP-hard, even for
a small, constant number of strategies. For player-specific singleton congestion
games we showed how to obtain a strong equilibrium in polynomial time and how
to recognize a given state as a strong equilibrium. Interestingly, our results im-
ply that there always exist sequences of coalitional improvement moves to strong
equilibria that are of polynomial length, and we showed how to obtain the corre-
sponding deviations for the players efficiently. For regular congestion games, even
when the strategy space has simultaneously a symmetric network and matroid
structure, the existence problem for strong equilibria is strongly co-NP-hard. Ad-
ditionally, we can even show weak co-NP-hardness for such games that have only
two players. For bottleneck congestion games, we developed a polynomial time
algorithm to compute a strong equilibrium for symmetric network and matroid
games. For general games, however, we proved that the problem of computing a
strong equilibrium is NP-hard, even in two-commodity networks. In contrast to
this positive result for symmetric network and matroid games, we showed that
it is NP-hard to decide if a coalitional improving move exists, even for matroid
and single-commodity network games, and even if the deviating coalition is fixed
a priori. This highlights an interesting contrast for these two classes of games:
While there are polynomial time algorithms to compute a strong equilibrium,
it is impossible to decide efficiently if a given state is a strong equilibrium –
the decision problem is co-NP-hard. It would be interesting to see how results
on centralized computation of strong equilibria extend to the computation of
α-approximate strong equilibria.
We initiated the study of altruists in atomic congestion games. Our model is
similar to the one presented by Chen and Kempe [CK08] for nonatomic routing
games, however, we observe quite different properties. In the nonatomic case,
existence of Nash equilibria for any population of agents is always guaranteed,
even if agents are partially spiteful. In contrast, our study answers fundamental
questions for existence and convergence in atomic games. For the case of linear
delay functions, an elegant combination of social cost and the Rosenthal potential
proves guaranteed existence and convergence. In addition, this result is based on
a more general condition, which is applicable to prove existence and convergence
in games with potential function from different domains. In the case of weighted
congestion games on parallel links with linear delay functions we have observed
that even a slight variation in the interplay of social cost and potential functions
can lead to instability and negative results. There are a number of open problems
and research directions that stem from our results. An interesting open problem
is to consider the price of anarchy and the relations to results on Stackelberg
games [Fot07]. An altruistic variant of the price of malice [MSW06,MOSW08]
measuring the influence of altruists on the worst-case Nash equilibrium can be
interesting to consider. While we have studied existence of pure Nash equilibria
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and convergence of better-response dynamics in congestion games with sum social
cost, the natural open problem is to analyze the model for other prominent social
cost functions – the maximum cost of any player being the prime example. In
addition, there are several generalizations such as bottleneck congestion games, in
which consideration of altruistic behavior might be worthwhile. More generally,
it is important to obtain a deeper understanding of more general (potential)
games, in which pure Nash equilibria exist and convergence is guaranteed even
for altruistic agents. Finally, the complexity of computing such an equilibrium
and the duration of best- and better-response dynamics in classes of games with
altruistic agents represent intriguing open problems for further research.
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Appendix
Description of G(n)
In this section, we recapitulate the construction of G(n) from [SV08]. This shows
that (bottleneck) congestion games do not converge quickly to a pure Nash equi-
librium even if the players only perform α-greedy steps.
We construct a (bottleneck) congestion game G(n) that resembles a recursive
run of n programs, i.e., sequences of α-greedy steps. After its activation, program
i triggers a run of program i − 1, waits until it finishes its run, and triggers it
a second time. These sequences are deterministic apart from the order in which
some auxiliary players make their improvement steps.
Strategies of Blockji Resources Delays
(1) tji δ
i−1/2α2δi−1
bji δ
i−1/δi+2
(2) c1i 2αδ
i−1/δi+2
Figure 1: Definition of the strategies of the players Blockji
A program i is implemented by a gadget Gi consisting of a main player that
we call Maini and eight auxiliary players called Block
1
i , . . . ,Block
8
i . The main
player has nine strategies numbered from 1 to 9. Each auxiliary player has two
strategies, a first and a second one. A gadget Gi is idle if all of its players play
their first strategy. Gadget Gi+1 activates gadget Gi by increasing the delay of
(the bottleneck resource in) the first strategy of player Maini. In the follow-
ing sequence of improvement steps the player Maini successively changes to the
strategies 2, . . . , 8. We call this sequence a run of Gi. During each run, Maini
activates gadget Gi−1 twice by increasing the delay of the (bottleneck resource
in the) first strategy of Maini−1. Gadget Gi+1 is blocked (by player Block
8
i ) until
player Maini reaches its strategy 9. Then Gi+1 continues its run, that is, it de-
creases the delay of the bottleneck resource in the first strategy of player Maini,
waits until gadget Gi becomes idle again, and afterwards triggers a second run
of Gi. The role of the auxiliary players of Gi is to control the strategy changes
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of Maini and Maini+1.
In the initial state s, every gadget Gi with 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 is idle. Gadget Gn
is activated. In every improvement path starting from s, gadget Gi is activated
2n−i times, which yields the theorem.
Now we go into the details of our construction. The (bottleneck) congestion
game G(n) consists of the gadgets G1, . . . , Gn. Each gadget Gi consists of a player
Maini and the players Block
1
i , . . . ,Block
8
i . The nine strategies of a player Maini
are given in Figure 2. The two strategies of a player Blockji are given in Figure 1.
δ = 10α9 is a scaling factor for the delay functions.
The auxiliary players implement a locking mechanism. The first strategy of
player Blockji is {t
j
i , b
j
i} and its second strategy is {c
j
i}. The delays of the resources
bji and c
j
i are relatively small (δ
i−1 and 2αδi−1, respectively) if allocated by only
one player. If they are allocated by two or more players, however, then each of
them induce a significantly larger delay of δi+2. Theses resources are also part of
the strategies of Maini or Maini+1. Note, that neither Maini nor Maini+1 has an
incentive to change to a strategy having a delay of δi+2 or more. The delay of the
resource tji is chosen such that Block
j
i has an incentive to change to its second
strategy if Maini allocates this resource. If Maini neither allocates this resource
nor the resource bji , it has an incentive to change to its first strategy. Due to
scaling factor δi−1 the delays of the resource tji do not affect the preferences of
Maini.
These definitions yield the following properties. If auxiliary player Blockji of
gadget Gi plays its first strategy then this prevents Maini from choosing strategy
j + 2. Player Blockji has an incentive to change to its second strategy only if
player Maini chooses its strategy j+1. By this mechanism, we ensure that Maini
chooses the strategies 1 to 8 in the right order. In addition, the first strategy
of Block8i prevents Maini+1 from going to strategy 4 or 8. This ensures that
Maini+1 waits until the run of player Maini is completed. Furthermore, Maini+1
can enter into strategy 3 or 7 only if all auxiliary players of gadget Gi use their
first strategy. This ensures that a run starts with all auxiliary players being in
their first strategy.
This shows that in every sequence of improvement steps from s to a Nash equi-
librium in the (bottleneck) congestion game G(n) each gadget i is activated 2n−i
times. One can easily check that every improvement step of a player decreases
its delay (of the bottleneck resource) by a factor of at least α and every delay
function satisfies the β-bounded-jump condition with β = δ3 with δ = 10α9.
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Strategy Resources Delays
(1) e1i δ
i/9α9δi
(2) e2i 8α
8δi
c1i−1, . . . , c
9
i−1 2αδ
i−2/δi+1
t1i δ
i−1/2α2δi−1
(3) e3i 7α
7δi
e1i−1 δ
i−1/9α9δi−1
t2i δ
i−1/2α2δi−1
b1i δ
i−1/δi+2
(4) e4i 6α
6δi
b8i−1 δ
i−2/δi+1
t3i δ
i−1/2α2δi−1
b2i δ
i−1/δi+2
(5) e5i 5α
5δi
t4i δ
i−1/2α2δi−1
b3i δ
i−1/δi+2
(6) e6i 4α
4δi
c1i−1, . . . , c
9
i−1 2αδ
i−2/δi+1
t5i δ
i−1/2α2δi−1
b4i δ
i−1/δi+2
(7) e7i 3α
3δi
e1i−1 δ
i−1/9α9δi−1
t6i δ
i−1/2α2δi−1
b5i δ
i−1/δi+2
(8) e8i 2α
2δi
b8i−1 αδ
i−2/δi+1
t7i δ
i−1/2α2δi−1
b6i δ
i−1/δi+2
(9) e9 αδi
t8i δ
i−1/2α2δi−1
b7i δ
i−1/δi+2
Figure 2: Definition of the strategies of the players Maini. The delay of resource
e1n is constantly 9α
9δn.
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Basics in Matroid Theory
In the following, we will briefly introduce the notion of matroids. For a com-
prehensive introduction as well as for the proofs of the mentioned results we
refer the reader to the textbooks of Korte and Vygen [KV02, Chapter 13] and
Schrijver [Sch03, Chapters 39 – 42].
Let F be a finite set. A tuple M = (F, I) where I ⊂ 2F is called a matroid
if (i) ∅ ∈ I, (ii) if I ∈ I and J ⊆ I, then J ∈ I, and (iii) if I, J ∈ I and
|J | < |I|, then there exists an i ∈ I \ J with J ∪ {i} ∈ I. A set A ⊆ F is
called independent if A ∈ I and dependent, otherwise. The set of (inclusion wise)
maximal independent subsets of F is called the basis of M .
For given F , a matroid (F, I) may be of exponential size, thus, one frequently
assumes that a matroid comes with an independence oracle that returns for all
sets A ⊆ F whether A ∈ I or not. It shall be noted that for many subclasses of
matroids an independence oracle can be implemented in polynomial time.
Another way of representing matroids is via a rank function rk : 2F → N.
Every sub-cardinal, monotonic and sub-modular function rk gives rise to a ma-
troid whose independent sets then are defined as {A ⊆ F : rk(A) = |A|}. If the
independent sets are known a priori via an independence oracle the rank function
is defined as rk(A) = maxI∈I:I⊆A |I|. With a slight abuse of notation, we define
for a matroid M = (F, I) the rank of the matroid itself as rk(M) = rk(F ).
To present our positive results for matroid bottleneck congestion games in
a general framework we give the definition of matroid union. This concept has
been introduced by Nash-Williams [NW67] and Edmonds [Edm68].
Definition .1 (Matroid union) Let M1 = (S1, I1), . . . ,Mk = (Sk, Ik) be ma-
troids. Define the union of these matroids as M1 ∨ · · · ∨Mk = (S1 ∪ · · · ∪Sk, I1 ∨
· · · ∨ Ik) where
I1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ik = {I1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ik : I1 ∈ I1, . . . , Ik ∈ Ik}.
Nash-Williams proved that for k matroids M1 = (S1, I1), . . . ,Mk = (Sk, Ik)
their union M1∨· · ·∨Mk is a matroid again. Edmonds [Edm70] showed that the
maximum cardinality of an independent set in I1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ik equals the maximum
cardinality of a common independent set of two suitably constructed matroids.
This observation reduces the problem of finding a maximum-size set in I1∨· · ·∨Ik
to the intersection problem of two matroids, which can be solved in polynomial
time, see the works of Edmonds [Edm70] and Cunningham [Cun86].
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